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INTRODUCTION
The literature on the customary laws of Kenya is probably more
extensive than that for any other country in East or Central Africa.
The Restatement of African law project has been able to compile a
bibliography of approximately seven hundred entries touching on the
subject.' In reviewing this literature preparatory to embarking on field-
work,2 I found sufficient material concerning the larger tribes-Boran,
Elgeyo, Embu, Gusii, Iteso, Kamba, Kikuyu, Kipsigis, Kuria, Luo
Luyia, Masai, Meru, Mijikenda, Nandi, Pokot, Samburu, Taita, and
Turkana-to permit me to construct for each a broad working outline
of the more limited field of customary wrongs. And yet the published
descriptions I read seemed terribly lifeless. Charles Dundas, an early
administrative officer in Kenya, wrote a detailed analysis of Kikuyu
and Kamba customs which strikingly illustrates this characteristic. The
following passage is typical:
In Ukamba, if a man strikes a corpse, he is liable for full blood
money; in Kikuyu he must pay approximately half (but in Ndia
one-third). The same payments are due if he should take any part
in a fatal fight, although he may have inflicted only the slightest
wounds, and in such cases he must observe the ordinary ceremonies
required for purification.'
RICHARD L. AHEL is Assistant Professor of Law, Yale University. B.A., Harvard,
1962; LL.B., Columbia, 1965. Field research on which this paper is based was conducted
under a fellowship granted by the Foreign Area Fellowship Program, from September
1967 to November 1968. However, the conclusions, opinions, and other statements in
this publication are mine and not necessarily those of the Fellowship Program. I wish
to express my deep gratitude to the many members of the Judicial Department of
Kenya who greatly facilitated my research: members and staff of the District Magis-
trate's Courts, the staff of the High Court library in Nairobi, and especially Mr. T. A.
Watts, Assistant to the Registrar of the High Court, whose generous assistance per-
mitted me to accomplish a great deal of work in a relatively short time.
1 Restatement of African Law Project, Draft Bibliography for East Africa (Kenya,
Somali Republic, Sudan, Tanganyika, Uganda, Zanzibar, n.d.) (cyclostyled) 83 + iii
pp. See also Abel, "A Bibliography of the Customary Laws of Kenya (with special
reference to the laws of wrongs)," II African Law Studies 1 (1969).
2I did the preliminary work on this subject in London during the two years I
was a Marshall Scholar from September 1965 to September 1967. I would here like to
thank Professor A. N. Allott and Mr. Eugene Cotran, of the African Law Section,
School of Oriental and African Studies, for allowing me access to the files of the
Restatement of African Law Project.
3 Dundas, "The Organization and Laws of Some Bantu Tribes in East Africa," 45
1. Roy. Anthrop. Inst. 234, 263-64 (1915).
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Do such statements in fact tell one anything about the nature or opera-
tion of a legal system? When would a man strike a corpse: in anger, in
despair, contemptuously? Would it be the corpse of an enemy, a friend,
a relative? What would the reaction of others be? How would the
alleged compensation be claimed, and by whom, and in what forum?
The second rule invites similar questions: under what circumstances
might a fatal fight occur; what actions would be considered to con-
stitute "taking part"? What is a slight wound? The rules offered by
Dundas are so dehumanized as to be almost absurd. Indeed, some are
absurd:
[The law of homicide does not consider the accused's state of
mind.] So strict is this broad rule that Kikuyu elders have told
me that if a man were seized by a lion, and his friend wishing to
save him were to throw a spear, he would be liable for com-
pensation if he inadvertently struck the man instead of the lion.4
My own legal syntheses, constructed upon such data, therefore con-
sisted of totally disembodied propositions, mere abstracts of abstracts. I
find in my notes a schedule of compensation among the Kikuyu for
bodily injuries: for loss of an eye, amounts ranging from ten to sixty
goats; for loss of a tooth, from one sheep to ten goats and a ram. These
conflicting assertions cannot be reconciled by particularization to the
circumstances in which the injury was inflicted because such informa-
tion is simply not available anywhere in the vast body of ethnographic
description.
I am increasingly convinced that the reason for these failings is that
few, if any, of the numerous ethnographic accounts contain any de-
scriptions of actual cases. Either investigators failed to observe or to
inquire about cases,5 or else they deleted all information about the
actual controversies from their reports.6 Instead, many appear to have
proceeded by asking informants, believed to be especially knowledge-
able about the customary law, to make conclusory statements about the
consequences of a particular course of action.7 This procedure seems
inevitably to elicit rules empty of content, of which Dundas' writing
is a particularly egregious, though not atypical, example. Anxious to
avoid these pitfalls, I considered an alternative approach to fieldwork-
the case method-suggested by my training in the common law tradi-
4 Ibid.
5 See, e.g., Hamilton, "Some Notes on Native Laws and Customs," I E. Afr. Prot.
L. Rep. 97 (1906); Leakey, "Some Notes on the Masai of Kenya Colony," 60 1. Roy.
Anthrop. Inst. 185 (1930).
6 See, e.g., Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya (1938); P. Mayer, Gusii Bridewealth Law
and Custom (1950); Ngala, Nchi na Desturi za Wagiriama (1949); Orchardson, The
Kipsigis (1961); Othieno-Ochieng', Luo Social System, with a Special Analysis of
Marriage Rituals (1968).
7 See, e.g., Bostock, The Taita (1950); Snell, Nandi Customary Law (1954).
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tion.8 This technique appears to possess several distinct advantages for
the study of customary law, which can best be demonstrated by con-
trasting the kinds of rules produced by the two methods.
These rules may be tested by two criteria: whether they adequately
portray the full range of experience within the society; and whether
they are distorted by bias in the investigator or the informant. Satis-
faction of the first criterion may in turn be judged according to
several subordinate standards, among which are:
(1) Specificity. Statements by an informant will often be vague and
general: "our rule is that a murderer is killed." There are many rea-
sons for this lack of specificity: ignorance of the detailed variations of
a rule in different factual situations; inability to think about, or to
express, the rule in terms of situational variables;' or simply response
to an overbroad question, such as: "what is your rule for murder?"
This last difficulty is not easily avoided. No outsider can be sufficiently
familiar with a society to be able to formulate as a hypothetical problem
every occasion on which the type of wrong might occur in that society.
The alternative solution, using the elements of the wrong taken from
another legal system-for instance, the English law of homicide-as
the source for hypothetical questions, distorts the significant detail, lend-
ing the data a false specificity.1" It is this lack of culturally significant
detail which makes many reported rules absurd: certainly all "mur-
derers" are not, in fact, killed. The case method avoids these dilemmas
by deriving rules from disputes. Rules are thus specified by the factual
details of a real controversy, so that each significant variable may be
identified, and no fictitious variables are introduced by the interroga-
tor's questions. Specificity no longer depends on the knowledge or
8 I certainly claim no originality in the use of this method. Indeed, the most venerable
guide to anthropological methodology emphasizes that the investigator must concentrate
on eliciting concrete instances of reputed customs. Roy. Anthrop. Inst. of Great Britain
and Ireland, Notes and Queries on Anthropology 36-37 (6th ed., 1951). But in view
of the widespread agreement on the value of case materials, their neglect by legal
researchers is that much more striking and unforgivable.
9 See A. L. Epstein, "The Case Method in the Field of Law," in The Craft of Social
Anthropology 205, 210 (Epstein ed. 1967): "In my own fieldwork among the Bemba,
and later in the African urban courts of the Copperbelt, I found that court members
could expound the points involved in a case they had just been hearing with great
command and infinite patience, but they were much less at home in the discussion of
hypothetical issues which I would sometimes have to put to them. This was not because
they were unintelligent or lacking in legal insight and imagination, but because their
mode of legal thinking was particular rather than abstract: the rules of law they
expounded were not conceived as logical entities; they were rather embedded in a
matrix of social relationships which alone gave them meaning."
Bohannan appears to be making a related point when he says: "Tiv have 'laws' but
do not have 'law'. . . . In Tivland there are atindi or 'rules,' but they have not been
especially organized for jural purposes." justice and Judgment among the Tiv 57-58
(1957).
10 Cf. Roy. Anthrop. Inst., op. cit. supra note 8 at 36 (criticizing the use of question-
naires). But cf. Poirier, Questionnaire d'ethnologie juridique appliqui 4 l'enqu~te de
droit coutumier (1963).
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abilities of the informant since the decision maker, the source of data,
is forced to fashion a rule to meet the disputed issues, and need not
know how variant situations would be resolved.
(2) Comprehensiveness. If rule-directed interviews fail to uncover
the details of any single rule, they are also inadequate to explore the
full range of legal prescriptions governing a society. The experience
of any individual is necessarily limited, and his memory imperfect.
Consequently no informant, nor even any group of informants, can
be expected to know all the rules of conduct. 1 Further, they are not
likely to be able to give a spontaneous recitation of all the rules they do
know. The investigator is then brought up against the dilemma sug-
gested above, of his own incomplete knowledge of the society under
scrutiny, and the danger of ethnocentric bias in the use of questions
based on a model drawn from another society. The case method cir-
cumvents these difficulties by permitting an investigator, even one
substantially ignorant of the scope of the indigenous legal system, to
obtain as comprehensive a report as he desires merely by continuing
the collecting of cases until repetition convinces him that all but the
most aberrant situations have been identified. It is probably true for
African societies, as Holmes has said of American, 2 that most, if not
all, possible controversies occur within the history of a single genera-
tion.
(3) Representativeness. Rule-directed inquiry appears to seek for
broad principles rather than the unique example. As a result, the rules
it produces acquire an undeserved facade of gererality. But in fact an
informant may have based his conclusory statement on a single, un-
representative instance. Multiplying informants does not avoid the
risk that all may in fact be relying on the same atypical situation. The
danger is inherent in the method which fails to discover, and conse-
quently to disclose, the factual experience underlying the asserted
prescription. It may lead the investigator to accept unquestioningly a
proposition which is absurd on its face. Goldschmidt, writing recently
about Sebei law, asserts: "one informant indicated that the middle child
of triplets always [my italics] is squeezed by his siblings and dies."'"
11 See Hall, "The Study of Native Court Records as a Method of Ethnological
Inquiry," 11 Africa 412, 413 (1938) (example of rule discovered from study of cases
which had not been reported by previous investigators); cf. Herskovits, "The Hypo-
thetical Situation: A Technique of Field Research," 6 Southwestern J. Anthrop. 32,
36 (1950) (informants may omit vital information because they take for granted that
everyone knows it).
12 Holmes, "The Path of the Law," 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 458 (1897): "The reports
of a given jurisdiction in the course of a generation take up pretty much the whole
body of the law, and restate it from the present point of view." Cf. Hall, "Nyakyusa
Law from Court Records," 2 Ajr. Stud. 153 (1953): "It would indeed have been
surprising if there had been any aspect of Native law not covered by the Courts, since
the annual average of civil cases heard over the years 1936-1940 has been 5,450."
13 Goldschmidt, Sebei Law 95 (1967).
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How many triplets could the informant have been familiar with?"4
Certainly not enough to justify the conclusory adjective "always." By
contrast, when research focuses on actual cases it is immediately clear
whether a stated rule is evidenced by numerous, mutually confirming,
applications, or is merely the reflection of isolated, and therefore sus-
pect, happenstance.
Not only must the rules be adequate-specific, comprehensive, repre-
sentative-they must be the right rules. I have already suggested above
several ways in which the structure of an interview can condition the
nature of the product:
(1) Asking the wrong questions. Unless the investigator is willing
to produce an incomplete record of the customary law he must model
the questions he asks not on the indigenous social structure, which he
knows incompletely or inaccurately, but on a legal system-real or
analytic-with which he is familiar. The questions he then asks, for-
instance: "what happens when a son murders his mother," may be
meaningless in indigenous terms, and the informant will frequently
answer: "that never happens." An investigator who refuses to accept
such a reply may finally elicit a rule, but it will be a rule designed to
fit the analytic system, not one derived from indigenous experience.
"It never happens" is in fact a truer description. A study of cases will
uncover the fact that it never happens and accept that fact as a highly
significant element in the description of what actually does happen.
(2) Asking questions in the wrong way. Just as the subject of a
question may demand information about a course of conduct that has
no social reality, so the form of a question will prefigure the way in
which actual conduct is analyzed. An investigator may ask: "Is a man
liable for abuse uttered when he is drunk" and receive the reply: "no."
He can only understand that reply in terms of the question, which was
in turn drawn from an analytic system in which "intoxication" is a
significant category. He will then derive a rule that intoxication is a
defence in abuse cases. The informant may in fact be answering the
question by reference to an indigenous category: there is no liability
for abuse when it is part of a non-serious exchange of insults, and the
fact that the defendant was drunk can only mean that he was at a
drinking party, one example of such a non-serious occasion. The case
method would use as its data instances of abuse, including drinking
parties, from which the analyst would have a better chance of seeing
those categories which are significant in indigenous terms."
14Triplets occur statistically about once in every 5,800 births, see Guttmacher,
Pregnancy and Birth 214 (rev. ed. 1962) (statistic for black Americans) or, among
the 24,000 Sebei, no more than a handful of times a generation. In a society lacking
mass communications the rule could not have been based on personal knowledge of
more than one or two instances.
15 See Bohannan, op. cit. supra note 9, at 4-5.
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The informant may introduce further distortions, in addition to those
discussed above.
(1) Bias against indigenous practices. In any interview situation the
subject is under pressure to give those answers he believes the investi-
gator wishes to hear. These pressures are intensified where, as in con-
temporary Africa, the investigator is of a higher social status than the
informant, and often of a different race. It is widely known that Euro-
peans, and many educated Africans, condemn a practice like infanticide,
disapprove of bride-wealth payments, and disbelieve in witchcraft. An
informant may conceal or misreport actual practices in order to win
the investigator's approval, and perhaps also to protect those practices
from change."6 Decisions in actual disputes are, of course, just as
subject to the pressures of modernization as is the testimony of in-
formants. But use of such disputes as data insures that the investigator
will be recording real changes in the customary law, and not just a
fa~ade of change erected to appease the perceived biases of the
researcher.
(2) Bias in favor of traditional practices. This is to some extent the
obverse of the above danger. Instead of exaggerating the extent to
which customary law has altered to meet modern conditions and new
values, the informant may glorify the pre-colonial experience, refus-
ing to admit that any change has occurred. The likelihood of such
bias is often substantially increased by the choice of informant, for
today only the older men in many communities retain any extensive
knowledge of customary law. The use of actual cases eliminates this
bias, since every rule may be specified chronologically by the date
when the dispute occurred.
(3) Ideal rather than actual rules: the is/ought distinction. The
two biases already mentioned-modernity and traditionalism-can be
generalized as a defect inherent in rule-directed inquiry: the possibility
that replies may refer to ideal rules rather than actual behavior, to
what the law ought to be rather than what it is. Statements of ideal
behavior are certainly an important element in the culture of any
group, but they are not law. To paraphrase Holmes1" again, the prophe-
cies of how disputes will be decided in fact, and nothing more pre-
tentious, are what I mean by the law. Perhaps the most significant
merit of the case method is its insistence upon concentrating on actual
controversies without being misled by the prescriptions of ideal
morality.
In view of the advantages claimed for the case method, why has it
"6 See Herskovits, supra note 11, at 37; cf. Barnes, "Some Ethical Problems in
Modern Fieldwork," 14 Brit. 1. Sociol. 118, passim (1963). But see Roy. Anthrop.
Inst., op. cit. supra note 8, at 29-30.
17 Holmes, supra note 12, at 461: "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact,
and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."
[Vol. 17
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not been used more extensively? Fifty years ago, at the time Dundas
was writing, an explanation might have been found in the prevailing
legal philosophy, whether explicitly held by the investigator or adhered
to unwittingly. "Legal absolutism"-the term is Jerome Frank's-
denied to mere controversies any significant value as evidence of the
law: "The decision of a court, determining a particular controversy
... can in no sense be regarded in itself law, whether it be the doom
of an ancient monarch, the decision of a popular court, or the judg-
ment of a modern tribunal."' 8 But today we are all more or less legal
realists, accepting Holmes' emphasis on cases as the starting point of
legal research. Significantly, it was the leading proponent of this school,
Karl Llewellyn, who joined with an anthropologist, E. Adamson
Hoebel, to execute the first broad study of customary law based entirely
on what they called "trouble cases."'"
That this approach was not immediately imitated is therefore prob-
ably due more to the practical difficulties it posed than to any jurispru-
dential aversion, for the case method places a far greater burden on the
fieldworker. An interviewer, once he identifies a cooperative, knowl-
edgeable informant, can survey an entire legal system in the course of
discussions occupying a few days. It is true, of course, that an equally
comprehensive collection of cases may be obtained with little more
difficulty from an informant."0 But if reliance is not to be placed on
the incomplete and warping memories of men then disputes must be
recorded contemporaneously, which demands extended residence in
the community, as well as considerable technical abilities.
The investigator cannot know in advance where, when, or by whom
a dispute will be mediated. Even in those societies possessing formal
agencies for settlement adjudication is not conducted according to a
predetermined calendar. But in many tribes the very identity of the
participants in the settlement process depends on the relationship of
the litigants and the circumstances of the controversy. The investigator
can insure his presence at the discussions only by being in the vicinity,
"on call" when the dispute first erupts. And then he must in addition
be fluent in the vernacular or work through, or with the assistance of,
interpreters who have that ability. Only the anthropologist has com-
bined the dedication and patience required to observe actual disputes
with the technical skills necessary to translate observation into under-
18 Beale, Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1916) quoted in Frank, Law and the
Modern Mind 53 (6th ed. 1949).
19 Llewellyn and Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way (1941). See also Hoebel, "Funda-
mental Legal Conceptions in Primitive Law," 51 Yale L. 1. 951, 966 (1942). For a more
recent assertion of the realist position, see Seidman, Research in African Law and the
Processes of Change 12-13 (1967).
20 This was in fact the method whereby Llewellyn and Hoebel collected their case
materials during the course of two summers. Op. cit. supra note 19, at viii.
1969]
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standing." Other investigators-settlers,2 travellers," missionaries,"
early administrators25-have been limited to rule-directed interviews.
In recent years, however, the development and modernization of
African legal systems has created a significant new resource for the
study of customary law. Judicial structures, recognized or created by
the colonial regimes to administer indigenous law and retained by
the independent states with some modifications, are increasingly pro-
ducing written records of their proceedings, possessing ever greater
detail and comprehensiveness." These materials have for some time
been used by administrators,27 who perhaps are favorably predisposed
since they often sit at the appellate level of this judicial hierarchy. But
other disciplines, while allowing court records a limited value, appear
reluctant to use them extensively. Although some anthropologists have
supplemented observation with written data,28 many appear to view
both the courts and their records with suspicion.29 And it is unques-
21 See Epstein, op. cit. supra note 9 at 222-23. Anthropologists have, in consequence,
written the classic works in the jurisprudence of customary law and the judicial process
in Africa. See, e.g., Bohannan, op. cit. supra note 9; Gluckman, The Judicial Process
among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia (2nd ed. 1967); Gulliver, Social Control in
an African Society (1963); Fallers, Law without Precedent (1969). Few anthropologists
working within Kenya have turned their attention specifically towards legal problems,
but an outstanding example of the use of case materials to illuminate the nature of
authority and the process of dispute settlement is Spencer, The Samburu (1965).
22 See, e.g., Shaw, "Some Preliminary Notes on Luo Marriage Customs," 45-46 1. E.
Afr. & Ug. Nat. Hist. Soc. 29 (1932); Augustiny, "The Tribes of Ukamba, their His-
tory, Customs, etc.," 2 E. Afr. Q. 405-13 (1905).
23 See, e.g., Gregory, The Great Rift Valley: being the narrative of a journey to
Mount Kenya and Lake Baringo (1896); New, Life, Wanderings, and Labours in
Eastern Africa (1897).
24 See, e.g., Cagnolo, The Akikuyu (1933); Stam, "Bantu Kavirondo of Mumias
District (near Lake Victoria)," 14-15 Anthropos 968 (1919-20).
25 See, e.g., Beech, "Sketch of Elgeyo Law and Custom," 20 J. Afr. Soc. 195 (1921);
Massam, The Clifi Dwellers of Kenya (1927).
26 Again, I must acknowledge that I am merely following the lead of earlier investi-
gators in utilizing this source. See, e.g., Allott, "Methods of Legal Research into Custom-
ary Law," 5 J. Afr. Admin. 172, 173 (1953); Hall, supra note 12; Hall, supra note 11;
Lewin, "The Recording of Native Law and Custom," 37 J. Roy. Afr. Soc. 483, 485
(1938); African Studies Branch, Colonial Office, "Methods of Recording Native Cus-
tomary Law," 11. Afr. Admin. 130 (1949).
27 See, e.g., Penwill, Kamba Customary Law (1951) (District Commissioner, Macha-
kos District); Edgar, Notes on Kipsigis Customary Law (1958) (cyclostyled; copy in
Law Courts, Nairobi) (District Officer, Kericho). Nevertheless, though both authors
state explicitly that they rely on court records, neither quotes the facts of a single case.
Compare Howell, A Manual of Nuer Law (1954) (Ass't Dist. Comm'r, Zeraf Dist.,
Sudan; extensive quotation of cases).
28 See, e.g., Bohannan, "Homicide and Suicide in North Kavirondo," in African
Homicide and Suicide 154 (Bohannan ed. 1960); Wilson, Luo Customary Law and Mar-
riage Law Customs (1961); LeVine, "Gusii Sex Offences: a Study in Social Control,"
61 Amer. Anthrop. 965 (1959); cf. Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law (1962); Crawford, Witch-
craft and Sorcery in Rhodesia 1-8 (1967).
26 See, e.g., Goldschmidt, op. cit. supra note 13, at 21: "On the whole, however, these
court cases are the least satisfactory of my data, not only because it is difficult to assess
the influence of other cultures on actions taken, but because they were always frag-
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tionably true that courts are an alien institution which modify tradi-
tional custom as they apply it. Lawyers, initially more attracted to
court judgments by their similarity to the subject matter of orthodox
legal research, s" seem to have been disenchanted for a reason just the
obverse of that of the anthropologists. Customary courts, to lawyers,
are insufficiently like their European models-generally highly informal
and frequently tainted with corruption-and their judgments are sadly
lacking in judicial reasoning. -
In preparing my own research plan, I knew beforehand that I
lacked the skills to observe actual cases. Persuaded by the complemen-
tary objections of anthropologists and lawyers to court records, I
anticipated that I would concentrate on rule-directed interviews. In-
stead, my initial exposure to court records convinced me that here was
mentary .... I find that court cases are relatively unimportant to the analysis, and I
have used them with caution." Cf. Cory, Sukuma Law and Custom (1953) (Tangan-
yika Government Sociologist).
30 See, e.g., Kerr, The Native Law of Succession in South Africa (1961); Elias, The
Nature of African Customary Law 3 (1956). In discussing the methods he employed
to determine the rules of customary law, Elias refers to "the increasing volume of
recorded judicial decisions of statutory courts established in many areas of the Con-
tinent-by far the most reliable source of information for the legal theorist no less than
for the professional lawyer." Nevertheless he does not quote or cite a single such case
in his extensive treatise.
31 See, e.g., Allott, supra note 26, at 173: "The potential investigator should be
warned that: (i) records of proceedings are frequently imperfect (perhaps contain-
ing little more than the claim and the decision without any reasons therefore), or unin-
telligible, or not in English; (ii) native court records are often disappointing for one
seeking a statement of the rules of customary law (it may be necessary to read the
whole case, including the evidence as recorded to get an idea of the point at issue);
(iii) bias or perversion of justice may intrude into a decision .. " Compare Allott,
Essays in African Law 84-94 (1960); Park, The Sources of Nigerian Law 83-97 (1963).
See also Cotran, Report on Customary Criminal Oflences in Kenya 2-6 (1963) (no use
made of case materials); Cotran, Restatement of African Law, Kenya, vol. 1: The Law
of Marriage and Divorce (1968) (no use of the vast bulk of case material from the
primary and appellate courts). But anthropologists have recognized, and demon-
strated, how legal principles can be derived from a study of the entire body of testimony
when read in conjunction with the judgment of a case. See, e.g., Fallers, "Customary
Law in the New African States," in African Law: New Law for New Nations 71, 82
(Baade ed. 1963). Nevertheless, the most recent evaluation of the utility of primary
court decisions, representing a consensus of lawyers and anthropologists, has been
generally unfavorable. See Allott, Epstein and Gluckman, "Introduction," in Ideas and
Procedures in African Customary Law 1, 8-9 (Gluckman ed. 1969): "First, how far
can a clear rule of law, in its full context, be derived from a single judicial decision?
Where one has only a short statement of a decision, without full presentation of the
arguments and judicial reasoning, it is difficult to see how the decision was arrived at
to fit the particular set of circumstances before it. . . . Secondly, since only a few, or
even no, cases in certain areas of dispute may occur in any period of time, informa-
tion has to be collected by discussions both with customary judges and with ordinary
citizens, on remembered disputes and on cases stated, varied as much as possible, as
well as on statements of what customary rules were and are."
It will be clear from my previous discussion of research methods that I question the
theoretical underpinnings of the techniques advocated. I hope that the case analyses
presented below will answer some of the criticisms of the case method which this quota-
tion expresses.
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an invaluable source of information on customary law, far superior to
any other accessible to me. Consequently, I devoted almost the entire
year I lived in Kenya to the selection and summary of case reports, col-
lecting a total of more than 4,000 from about forty courts. I found it
necessary to supplement these materials in only one significant respect,
with data on out-of-court arbitration, in order to place the role of the
courts within the wider perspective of conflict resolution.
The purpose of this paper is to describe the case materials available
for the study of customary law in Kenya, with illustrations from. the
data I gathered, and locate them within the context of the judicial and
extrajudicial structures for dispute settlement. In the process I will try
to demonstrate how these resources justify the claims of the case
method, and to answer the criticisms of anthropologists and lawyers.
Although my research was restricted to Kenya, I hope this analysis of
techniques and materials will have some value for those engaged in
similar work elsewhere, especially in those parts of anglophonic Africa
which possess comparable legal systems.
II. JUDICIAL SYSTEM
As early as 1897," only two years after the declaration of the East
Africa Protectorate" (as Kenya was then known), the British ad-
ministration formally recognized certain indigenous agents of dispute
settlement by granting jurisdiction to existing "courts" of local chiefs
and councils of elders. 4 Although avowedly based on traditional insti-
tutions, these courts were an integral part of the unitary judicial system
of the Colony." Five years later the administration moved a step
32 For a comprehensive history of the primary courts of Kenya up to 1945, see
Phillips, Report on Native Tribunals (1945). More recent descriptions are: Phillips,
"The African Court System in Kenya," 4 1. Air. Admin. 135 (1952); Carson, "Further
Notes on the African Courts System in Kenya," 10 1. Afr. Admin. 34 (1958); Cotran,
"Kenya," in Judicial and Legal Systems in Africa 89 (Allott ed. 1962); Watts, "The
Court of Review. The Appeal System: African Courts. Chapter 11 of the Laws of
Kenya," 2 E.A.L.J. 151 (1966); Cotran, "Integration of Courts and Application of
Customary Law in Kenya," 4 E.A.L.J. 14 (1968). See generally Colony and Protectorate
of Kenya: Native Affairs Department, Annual Report (1925-47); Colony and Protectorate
of Kenya: African Affairs Department, Annual Report (1948-57); Mungeam, British
Rule in Kenya, 1895-1912: The Establishment of Administration in the East Africa
Protectorate. (1966).
33On July 1, 1895. Hardinge to Salisbury, 2 July 1895, F.O.C.P. 6761; London
Gazette, 15 June 1895. Cited in Low, "British East Africa: The Establishment of
British Rule, 1895-1912," in 2 History of East Africa 1, 6 (Harlow & Chilver eds.
1965).
34 Native Courts Regulations, 1897, No. 52, §§2(b), 46 (East Africa Protectorate).
At the same time, the government established the beginnings of what it hoped
would be a system of direct rule, in the form of Native Courts presided over by
European officers. (§2(a)). Nothing ever came of this idea, and it was abandoned
about 1908. See Phillips, Report on Native Tribunals 7-10 (1945).
35 See Phillips, op. cit. supra note 34. Lawyers were also allowed to appear. Native
Court Regulations, 1897, No. 52, §81 (East Africa Protectorate); Rules for the Ad-
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further from tradition, strengthening the powers of those chiefs already
recognized,"6 and delegating additional judicial authority to the newly
instituted official headmen. 7 In 1910, noting the erosion in the influence
of indigenous elders as a result of the novel powers conferred on chiefs
and headmen, the new Governor, Sir Percy Girouard, sought to reaf-
firm their position, guided by the principle of indirect rule.8 But little
was changed until 1930, when a major revision separated the judiciary
from the executive powers of the chief or headman and further segre-
gated the African judicial machinery from the structure serving the
rest of the population. 9 Revitalized panels of elders, explicitly consti-
tuted "in accordance with the native law or custom of the area"4 now
formed the base of a judicial hierarchy in which appeal lay to Native
Appeals Tribunals,41 and then to District" and Provincial Commis-
ministration of Justice in Native Courts under the East Africa Order in Council, 1897,
§52 (Oct. 21, 1899); Native Court Practitioners Rules, 1899 (Oct. 23, 1899) (East
Africa Protectorate).
S6 East Africa Native Courts Amendment Ord., No. 31 of 1902. Section 2 authorized
the Commissioner to proclaim any district a special district to which the 1897 Regula-
tions would not apply; he made such a proclamation that same day with respect to all
the provinces apart from the coast: Ukamba, Naivasha, Kisumu, Kenya, and Jubaland.
However, §15(1) of the Ordinance perpetuated the chief's courts: "Nothing herein to
affect the power of the Commissioner to recognize the jurisdiction of a tribal Chief over
the members of his tribe, or the exercise by such tribal Chief of such authority as may
be lawfully vested in him, or may be granted to him by the Commissioner."
31 Village Headman Ord., No. 22 of 1902 §6 (East Africa Protectorate): "The Com-
missioner may make rules conferring upon any headman or any body of headmen in
any village or group of villages the power to hear and determine petty native cases to
such extent and upon such conditions as to appeal and procedure as the Commissioner
may determine." The jurisdiction of both types of court was limited to members of
the tribe, and in some cases only of the village, in which the court sat. Courts Ord., No.
13 of 1907, §10(1) (East Africa Protectorate); Rules Under Section 10 of the "Courts
Ordinance, 1907," §§2, 9 (Mar. 30, 1908).
38 Native Tribunal Rules, 1911, §2(1) (Apr. 4, 1911) (East Africa Protectorate): "The
powers conferred by these rules shall be exercised only by such Councils of Elders as
are constituted under and in accordance with Native law and custom and are recog-
nized by the Governor." [italics added]. Native Authority Ord., No. 22 of 1912, §2(1)
(East Africa Protectorate): "The Governor may appoint any Chief or other Native or
any Council of Elders to be Official Headman or Collective Headmen.. .. " See
Phillips, op. cit. supra note 34, at 13-15. This emphasis on indirect rule appears to have
been short-lived, for the italicized words in the 1911 Rules were eliminated two years
later by the then Governor, H. C. Belfield. Native Tribunal Rules, 1913, Government
Notice No. 43, §§2, 3 (Feb. 6, 1913) (East Africa Protectorate). See also Courts Ord.,
Laws of Kenya, cap. 5, §11 (1926).
39 Native Tribunals Ord., No. 39 of 1930 (Kenya). Advocates were now excluded.
§24. Authority was extended to all causes of action arising within, crimes occurring
within, or defendants residing within, the jurisdiction of the court. §§10, 11.
40 §4.
41 §33(1). The Provincial Commissioner, with the approval of the Governor, could
appoint a Native Tribunal, presided over by a headman, or senior elder, or composed
of three selected elders, to be a court of appeal. In Coast Province, the Moslem liwali or
mudir was later included as an intermediate appellate authority, Native Tribunals
(Amendment) Ord., No. 38 of 1940, §§6-8.
42 §34(1), (2). Appeals were later transferred to the District Officer. Native Tribunals
(Amendment) Ord., No. 31 of 1933.
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sioners." On the recommendations of the Phillips report" this struc-
ture was reformed in 1951."5 A start was made toward assimilating
the judicial system of the African community to the pattern of that
principally used by non-Africans:'" tribunals were renamed African
Courts and ultimate judicial review was transferred from the Pro-
vincial Commissioner to a newly created Court of Review.' 7 Later, a
single level of lay magistrates replaced both the African Courts of
Appeal' 8 and review by administrative officers. 9 Finally, seventy years
after the introduction of a plural legal system in Kenya, the Magistrate's
Courts Act5° substantially eliminated the remaining dualism, trans-
forming African Courts into District Magistrate's Courts,51 competent to
hear cases involving all residents of Kenya," with a single route of
appeal to First Class5" or Resident Magistrates,5' then to the High
Court55 and in the last resort to the Eastern Africa Court of Appeal.5"
A. Primary Courts
Cases heard by the indigenous institutions recognized by, or novel
tribunals created under, enactments predating 1930 were not recorded,57
43 §34(3). Provision was made for ultimate review in the Supreme Court by means
of a case stated, §34(4), but none was ever taken. See Phillips, op. cit. supra note 34 at
5; Watts, supra note 32 at 156.
44 op. cit. supra note 34.
45 African Courts Ord., No.,65 of 1951.
46 In establishing these courts, the Provincial Commissioner was no longer bound to
follow native law and custom, but could determine the constitution of the court,
order of precedence, method of deciding in cases of dispute, limits of jurisdiction,
quorum, and use of assessors, §6.
47 §43. This court consisted of a chairman appointed by the Governor, the Chief
Native Commissioner, the African Courts Officer, and an African appointed by the
Governor (Shadrack Malo, a former President of the Central Nyanza African Court
of Appeals). African Courts Ord., No. 65 of 1951, §4(2). In 1962 the Chief Native
Commissioner was replaced by a second African. African Courts (Amendment) Ord.,
1962, No. 50 of 1962, §4(1).
48 By an amendment to the African Courts Act, about 1964.
-9 African Courts (Amendment) Ord., No. 50 of 1962, §38.
50 No. 17 of 1967.
51 §§8, 43(1), Second Schedule §2.
52 Compare Magistrate's Courts Act, No. 17 of 1967, §§9, 10, with African Courts Ord.,
No. 65 of 1951, §9.
rs Appeals from a Third Class Magistrate's court in civil cases are to a First Class
Magistrate. §12.
54 Appeals from a Third Class Magistrate's court in criminal cases are to a Resident
Magistrate. §4.
n5 Appeals from a Second or First Class Magistrate or a Resident Magistrate are to
the High Court in both civil matters, Civil Procedure Ord., Laws of Kenya, cap. 5,
§65(l) (1948), and criminal, Criminal Procedure Code, Laws of Kenya, cap. 75, §347
(1) (rev. ed. 1962), as amended by Magistrate's Courts Act No. 17 of 1967, §30.
56 Criminal Procedure Code, Laws of Kenya, cap. 75, §361(1) (rev. ed. 1962); Civil
Procedure Ord., Laws of Kenya, cap. 5, §72 (1948).
57 See Watts, supra note 32 at 155. At that time, this was thought to be too obvious
to require expression in the legislation, but it may be seen indirectly in the fact that
European administrators, in exercising their powers of revision, were to treat the
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and hence are lost to scholarship except as they may be studied through
the memories of informants. The 1930 Ordinance reorganized these
disparate bodies into several hundred native tribunals, 8 each consisting
of as many as fifty or more elders. These, like their predecessors and
successors, were instructed to apply "the Native Law and Custom
prevailing in the area of the jurisdiction of the tribunal."5  The elders
were presumed to know this customary law as an integral part of their
inherited tradition, a reasonable presumption since they were men of
little education, few European contacts, and served exclusively within
their own tribe.
During the next three decades the administration gradually attempted
to restructure these tribunals according to a European model. Their
numbers were reduced to a fairly stable figure of just over a hundred in
1966.60 The membership of each court was transformed from a large
group of elders participating irregularly for nominal pay to a much
smaller, more professional body, earning substantial salaries for fixed
duties, and hearing individual cases in panels of no more than ten ;1
by 1966 few courts had more than four members. Although the Native
Tribunals Ordinance did not make explicit provision for the record-
ing of proceedings, the literate clerks attached to these courts were en-
couraged to do so as far as they were able; useful records began to
appear in the 1950's, and improved dramatically in the next fifteen
years."2
controversy as an original case and hear it de novo. See, e.g., Rules under Section 10
of the "Courts Ordinance, 1907," §5 (Mar. 30, 1908); Native Tribunals Rules, 1913,
Government Notice No. 43, §14 (Feb. 6, 1913).
58 In 1943 there were 139 tribunals, already a substantial decrease from the situation
ten years earlier. See Phillips, op. cit. supra note 34, at 6. Between 1930 and 1937, in
Kavirondo Province, for instance, seventy-eight locational tribunals were reorganized
into twenty divisional courts. Id. at 17.
59 Native Tribunals Ord. No. 39 of 1930, §13(a). Similar provisions can be found in
all legislation pertaining to the judiciary, from the earliest, Native Courts Regulations,
No. 52 of 1897, §4 (Aug. 12, 1897), to the most recent, Magistrate's Courts Act, No. 17
of 1967, §§2, 10(1) (a); Judicature Act 1967, No. 16, §3(2).
60 See Phillips, op. cit. supra note 34, at 13-15, Watts, supra note 32, at 155. See
also the warrants establishing each court, which state when the court was created, when
abolished, and list its personnel. These are kept in the offices of the Provincial Com-
missioners and in the Law Courts, Nairobi.
61 See generally Phillips, op. cit. supra note 34, passim. In Kavirondo Province, for
instance, by 1943, elders were earning as much as sixty-five shillings a month, and the
tribunal president up to one hundred and fifty shillings. Id. at 20. In Kisii District panels
of six elders chosen from a pool of eighteen heard individual trials. Id. at 29.
62 See Watts, supra note 32, at 155. The 1930 Ordinance omitted the requirement,
contained in earlier enactments, that appeals be heard de novo. By 1950 parties were
requesting copies of the record and judgment with sufficient frequency to require the
setting of a fee for this service. Native Tribunals (Fees & Fines) (Amendment) Rules,
1950, Government Notice No. 867 (July 21, 1950). The African Courts Ordinance, No.
65 of 1951, provided for revision based on the record alone, §39(1) (a). During the
1950's a series of handbooks for the guidance of African Courts gave detailed instruc-
tions concerning the recording of evidence and the writing of judgments. See [Watts],
Standing Orders for African Courts, §§23-28, 104-18 (1956); Tennent, Notes and
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The Magistrate's Courts Act of 1967"3 completed this process, elimi-
nating several more courts to leave a total of ninety, each staffed by one
to four magistrates sitting individually." Because these were men of
superior English literacy, often clerks of the former African Courts,
their reports of cases developed from a mere listing of the names of
parties and the result to a full, if not verbatim, record of the evidence
followed by a reasoned judgment. These lay magistrates are currently
receiving intensive instruction in law emphasizing the basically English
procedure and Kenya substantive legislation they must apply. Training
in customary law is limited, even though familiarity with it can no
longer be taken for granted. 5 The present younger generation of
magistrates have often been isolated from their homes at an early age,
attending boarding school, living in urban areas, and later at university.
Furthermore, some are now being posted outside their tribal jurisdiction
altogether. The rules they administer are therefore going to bear a
diminishing resemblance to traditional practice.
How does this structure function, and what information does it
provide about the administration of customary law? A rough estimate
suggests that in 1966 the primary courts decided about 50,000 civil and
nearly 200,000 criminal cases.66 Civil cases were almost all governed by
customary law, i.e., an unwritten rule whether traditional or modern.
But legislation figured prominently in most criminal prosecutions."
Instructions for the Guidance of African Courts 2-7, 11-14 (1959) (Kakamega District);
Notes and Instructions for the Guidance of African Courts 36 (1959) (Machakos
District). While the above were merely advisory, the Chief Justice promulgated, under
the authority of African Courts Ord., No. 65 of 1951, §62(h), binding rules requiring
the recording of evidence and a reasoned judgment. African Courts Civil Procedure
Rules §§42, 49 (n.d.); Criminal Procedure Rules for African Courts §§54, 59 (n.d.).
63 No. 17.
64 §8(1).
65 §18: "A magistrate's court may, if it thinks fit, call for and hear evidence of the
African customary law applicable to any case before it."
66 The last official statistics available are those for criminal cases in 1961, when
153,441 cases were decided. Republic of Kenya, Judicial Department, Report, 1961-1963,
at 17 (1965). But I abstracted from the annual returns of each court, kept in the Law
Courts, Nairobi, some data on the quantity of litigation for 1966. My own totals, per-
haps somewhat inaccurate, show 51,225 civil and 191,914 criminal cases. These figures
have steadily increased in the recent past.
67 The only civil statute which the courts were authorized to administer was the
Affiliation Ord., No. 12 of 1959, Laws of Kenya, cap. 12, §2 (rev. ed. 1962), since
repealed. In 1966 my notes show 789 affiliation proceedings. The Magistrate's Courts
Act No. 17 of 1967, does, however, anticipate a general civil jurisdiction, either under
the customary law, §10(1) (a), or, subject to a jurisdictional limit determined by the
amount in claim, under the common or statutory laws of Kenya, §10(1)(b).
68 In 1966, when courts had authority to punish customary crimes during the first
six months, they heard only 2,049 cases, or about one percent of all prosecutions. Hence
even prior to 1966 customary criminal law was not very significant. However, the
percentages varied greatly from area to area. In Nyando African Court, a Luo tribunal,
for instance, violations of the Penal Code were only three times more frequent than
customary crimes. But in Sosiot African Court, in Kipsigisland, Penal Code prosecu-
tions were more than one hundred times as frequent.
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Indeed, the Constitution abolished all unwritten criminal law as of
June 1, 1966.6" Moreover, little more than a tenth of all prosecutions
were brought under the Penal Code,"° the remainder consisting of
contraventions of administrative regulations concerning trespass,"'
boundary markers,' markets," licensing," taxation, 5 stock move-
ment," production or consumption of alcohol" or narcotics," or non-
compliance with the orders of administrative personnel. 9 Nevertheless,
the primary courts can8" and do award compensation to the victims of
criminal offences according to what is basically an unwritten law,
derived, at least in part, from the customary law of wrongs.8 An indi-
vidual court, on average, may hear about 500 civil 2 and 1,000 criminal 3
6 Kenya Order in Council 1963, S.I. 1963/791, Schedule 2, The Constitution of
Kenya, §§8(8), 8(16). This section was implemented by African Courts Officer, Circu-
lar No. AC 13/1/11/70 (June 18, 1966) which instructed African Courts to terminate
all pending prosecutions under customary law, with leave to the complainant to file a
civil suit upon payment of additional fees. See, e.g., Maseno African Court Criminal
Case 454/66 (July 22, 1966) (prosecution for removing a married woman from the
custody of her husband under Luo customary law; plaintiff informed he can pay
50/- in addition to the initial 16/- fee and sue for the return of his wife).
70 My total for 1966 shows 22,875 prosecutions under the Penal Code, or just about
twelve percent of all criminal cases.
71 Trespass Ord., No. 48 of 1962, Laws of Kenya, cap. 294 (rev. ed. 1963).
72 Land Adjudication Act, Laws of Kenya, cap. 283, §35(4) (a) (rev. ed. 1964), as
amended by Land Adjudication Act 1968, No. 35 of 1968, §34(d); Registered Land
Act, Laws of Kenya, cap. 300, §24 (rev. ed. 1964).
73 Marketing of African Produce Ord., Laws of Kenya, cap. 320 (rev. ed. 1962).
74 Traders Licensing Ord., Laws of Kenya, cap. 497 (rev. ed. 1962).
7 Personal Tax Ord., Laws of Kenya, cap. 470 (rev. ed. 1962).
76 Animal Diseases Ord., Laws of Kenya, cap. 364 (rev. ed. 1962).
77 African Liquor Ord., Laws of Kenya, cap. 122 (rev. ed. 1962).
78 Dangerous Drugs Ord., Laws of Kenya, cap. 245 (rev. ed. 1962).
79 Native Authority Ord., Laws of Kenya, cap. 128 (rev. ed. 1962).
80 African Courts Ord., Laws of Kenya, cap. 11, §§19(1) 22, 23 (rev. ed. 1963);
Magistrate's Courts Act, No. 17 of 1967, §9(1); Criminal Procedure Code, Laws of
Kenya, cap. 75, §§175, 176 (rev. ed. 1962).
"I See, e.g., Kosele African Court Criminal Case No. 33 of 1966 (Jan. 20, 1966)
(court ordered accused to pay the customary compensation of a heifer for virginity in
a prosecution for indecent assault, Penal Code, §144); Bungoma District African Court
Criminal Case No. 493 of 1967 (June 22, 1967) (court ordered accused to pay custom-
ary compensation of a sheep in a prosecution for common assault, Penal Code, §250).
The following abbreviations will be used hereafter in citing cases: African Court-AC;
District African Court-DAC; African Court of Appeal-ACA; District Officer-DO;
Appeal Magistrate-Mag; Court of Review-COR: Civil Case-CC; Criminal Case-
CrC; Civil Appeal-CA; Application-Appl. Each case will be cited by number and
year, e.g., 234/65, followed by the presiding judge, where significant, and date of deci-
sion, where available, e.g. (Ainley, C. J., Jan. 1, 1966). Although it is customary to cite
cases by the names of the parties, I have omitted the names in all the citations that
follow in order to preserve the anonymity of the individuals involved, since the case
numbers provide adequate identification for anyone wishing to do further research
in this area.
82 The numbers range from 93 for the Kilgoris African Court, in the Masai area of
Narok District, Rift Valley Province, since closed down, to 1,694 in the Kavujai African
Court, serving the Luyia of Western Province.
83 The statistics range from 146 in the Kapkatet African Court in the Kipsigis area of
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cases each year. Court records generally date back several decades,
sometimes to the 1930's, though physical condition of course deterio-
rates radically with age. All are stored in the office of the court which
passed judgment, unless the case has been appealed." Although none
are in vernacular many, especially in Coast, Nyanza and Western
Provinces, were recorded in swahili, at least until very recently.
CASE STUDIES
In light of this sketch of the quantity of material available, the value
of information obtainable from illustrative cases may be placed in
proper perspective. The following case8" is quoted in full, as far as
possible in the same form as the original record. The parties are all
Luo.s°
Plaintiff: Augustino, Kanyawegi village, Kisumu location, Central Nyanza
District, Nyanza Province.
Defendants: Isabella w/o Onyango 1 idence
Atieno w/o Onyango I same res
Claim: 200/- damages for defamation (filed Aug. 18, 1966).
Plaintiff (Male, Christian, duly sworn states): The defendants said on 13
August [1966] that I am a witchcraft man, that I have killed their son,
that I am a jadaks 7 in their area and should go to Nyakach ss which is my
original home (loka [in dholuo]). The reason for this is that their son, Ogalo
Onyango disappeared from their home; he was searched for and finally a
report was received that he had died. Then the defendants broke out with
cry (sic) with my name that I killed him; they cried in their boma89 in the
absence of their husband. When Onyango returned he collected money and
went to search for his son in Sakwa.f ° But later it was revealed that Ogalo is
Kericho District, Rift Valley Province, since closed down, to 3,231 in the Kapsabet
African Court, Nandi District. In the urban areas totals are much higher, e.g., Tononoka
African Court-17,714 (Mombasa); Makadara African Court-10,087 (Nairobi).
84 See African Courts Officer, Circular No. I of 1963 (Jan. 25, 1963) amending
Standing Order No. 180 (case file to be kept in highest court which has passed judg-
ment). Compare African Courts Civil Procedure Rules §§77-79 (n.d.) (case file to be
returned to court of first instance).
8 Kisumu DAC CC 299/66 (Aug. 31, 1966). Because of limitations of space I have
had to select shorter cases. To preserve the anonymity of the parties and witnesses I
have used what I hope are appropriate pseudonyms, and have deleted the name of the
village.
86 A Nilotic tribe numbering just over a million and occupying most of Central and
South Nyanza Districts of Nyanza Province. See Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning
and Development, Statistics Division, III Kenya Population Census, 1962, at 36 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Kenya Census, 19621.
87 "An unrelated person who is given land on a permanent usufruct which is deter-
mined by his fulfillment of customary obligations." Wilson, Luo Customary Law and
Marriage Laws Customs 12 (1961).
88 Name of a Luo lineage (or tribe), and also of a location, in Central Nyanza, be-
tween the Nyando and Sondu Rivers; about twenty-five miles southeast of Kisumu
location and lineage, where the defendants live.
89 A swahili word, literally meaning fort, but widely used for home. Among the Luo
it refers to the living area surrounded by an ojuok (euphorbia) hedge.
90 Luo lineage (or tribe) and location in Central Nyanza, about forty miles west of
Kisumu.
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alive, and living up the hill at Kapotman.9 I did not see Ogalo myself when
he returned-he stayed just one night-but my boys told me. Then Ogalo
went back to where he is living in order to escape the summons of the court,
for he has been accused by another boy. (examined by Atieno): There was
no outstanding grudge between me and Ogalo. (examined by court): I am
only a few yards from the boma of defendants. I went there on bicycle quickly
alone. I saw Omolo and Oburu standing there; they also heard the defama-
tion. I did not report the defendants to the joduong' gweng'92 before suing
them here because I was angry.
Plaintiff's witness, Oburu (17 years old): On Saturday, 13 August, I was in the
boma of Onyango when the defendants, returning from the lake (nam
[in dholuo]) broke out into a cry for their son who was alleged to have died.
Atieno entered the boma carrying a karai3 and a basket (odheru [in dholuo])
and threw them down and said: "Aaa. Augustino, how have you killed the
son of Onyango so badly like this." Isabella began to cry: "Augustino, let all
your wives give birth to many children and name them after Ogalo." Then
she said: "let Onyango take any cattle he would have slaughtered for the
people who came to the funeral (joliel [in dholuo]) and use them to em-
ploy a clever man to take revenge aganist Onyango for killing his son."
(examined by Isabella): When you came from the lake I was in the house
(simba [in dholuo]) of your son Odhiambo.
(examined by court): Augustino was present in the boma at the time that
the defendants started crying.
Defendant 1 (Isabella) (Female, Christian, duly sworn states): I did not defame
Augustino's name. I only said that it is ridiculous how the boy Ogalo has
died in a far place where we do not know.
(examined by Augustino): We only received a letter which informed us that
Ogalo is vomiting blood and is likely to die, but we did not cry.
Defendant 2 (Atieno) (Female, Christian, duly sworn states): I did not defame
Augustino's name. We had no grudge against him which could make us men-
tion his name. I did not see him come to our boma at all.
(examined by Augustino): Our son did not die, but we received a letter say-
ing that he is likely to die, but we did not cry. I went to Sakwa where my son
died and slept there on 13 August.
Defendants' witness, Mathias: A letter came from Sakwa on 13 August to say
that defendants' son was beaten there. So the two defendants went there that
very day to see him. I never heard them cry anything.
(examined by court): I live in the boma of defendants because they are the
wives of my uncle (nera [in dholuo]).
Defendants' witness, Otieno: I live near the defendants. When I entered their
boma I heard them say, why had their son Ogalo died outside? They were
only talking, not crying.
Judgment [The court awarded the full claim, and 32/- costs.] Plaintiff's evidence
was corroborated by the testimony of his eye-witness, but defendants offered
mere denials. The court does not believe that the defendants contented them-
selves with the mild words they state now. Always when the mother received
information that her son or daughter has died she usually cried very loud
according to Luo customs.
91 In Nandi District, Rift Valley Province, and thus outside the jurisdiction of
African Courts or Administrative Police in Central Nyanza District, Nyanza Province.
92 Elders of a locality. See Wilson, op. cit. supra note 87 at 13.
9 1 believe that this is a knife or spear, probably used in fishing.
1969]
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The total sequence of events in this case can be reconstructed in
outline. Ogalo, the son of one of the defendants (co-wives of On-
yango) got into a fight away from home, in which both he and his
adversary were injured. He fled the scene and hid to avoid prosecu-
tion, but a letter reached his home, where people were already alarmed
by his prolonged absence, which contained an inflated rumor that he
was dead or dying. The defendants immediately burst into a lament,
blaming the tragedy on Augustino's witchcraft. Augustino heard their
cries, and when he came to investigate the accusations were repeated.
The women then rushed off to see the dying boy, but failed to find
him, as did their husband in a later search. In fact, Ogalo did not die
but was merely hiding to escape justice and when he revisited his family
the witchcraft accusation was dropped. Augustino then went straight
to court, filing his complaint five days after the incident, as soon as he
was able to collect the necessary 32/- fees. 4 He failed to submit the dis-
pute to arbitration because, in his anger, he wanted quick action. In the
event, he received his full claim less than three weeks after the incident.
There is little to be learned from the three sentence opinion taken
in isolation, and this paucity of reasoning, typical of many primary
court judgments, may be one reason for their neglect by lawyers. But
when the court record is read as a whole, patterns of assertion, adversa-
rial response, and judicial determination (whether implicit or explicit)
may be discerned which identify the sources of conflict and illuminate
the way in which controversial conduct is defended and evaluated.
Let me try to demonstrate this through a detailed analysis of the rela-
tively simple facts of this case, with the aid of Luo ethnography.
Although Augustino stated his claim as one for defamation, 5 thus
dignifying it with the prestigious terminology of the English common
law, the gravamen of his complaint was in fact that the defendants had
spoken words which were insulting to him. Both Isabella and the
court demonstrated this by focusing their questions on the critical
failure of Augustino and his witness to allege that Augustino was
present at the incident, an essential ingredient of the cause of action
where the injury is personal affront but not where it is damage to
reputation. 6 By far the more serious of the two insults alleged was the
94 Court fees in most civil cases are proportioned to the amount claimed. A demand
for 200/- requires a fee of 26/-, plus 6/- for service of an additional defendant. See
African Courts (Fees and Fines) Rules, Laws of Kenya, cap. 11, Subsidiary Legislation,
Schedule, §§2, 3 (rev. ed. 1963). Many rural Africans would not have that amount
available in cash, and would have to borrow or sell some produce.
95 Augustino is in fact illiterate, as shown by the fact that he signified his acceptance
of the record of his testimony by a thumb-print rather than by signing his name.
Therefore it is likely that it was the court clerk who filled out the forms, and intro-
duced English legal terminology.
6 Augustino and his witness concurred in this characterization by affirming on
examination that Augustino had been in the defendants' boma at the time. Further,
neither argued that the words were published outside the boma or that Augustino's
reputation was damaged.
[Vol. 17
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first-that Augustino was a witch who had killed the defendants' son.
This accusation was made explicitly by Atieno, but was also given
more subtle utterance by Isabella in her cry that Augustino's wives
should bear children named after Ogalo. One form of restitution for
homicide in Luo customary law is for the clan of the murderer to
provide a girl to bear progeny to the name of the deceased.97 It is
important to recognize that the defendants, in placing responsibility
for the death of their son on Augustino's witchcraft, were not denying
that the physical injury had been incurred in an ordinary fight with
another man; rather, witchcraft was invoked to explain why Ogalo
had become involved in the fight in the first place, and then why he
had suffered such egregious harm. Widespread belief in witchcraft
among the Luo has not greatly changed in the last sixty years,9" as
illustrated by the readiness with which these women-nominal Chris-
tians, if illiterate-resorted to it in trying to comprehend their tragedy.
Because witches are so greatly feared they are generally avoided, and
Augustino was at least threatened with ostracism if the accusation was
believed. Indeed, Isabella urged more drastic action-the use of anti-
witchcraft medicine99 to take revenge for the death of her son.
The second insult alleged-that Augustino was a jadak, or tenant,
who should go back to his clan's home-was much milder. lodak. °9 are
members of foreign lineages who have been granted land for purposes
of cultivation but who suffer from insecurity of tenure and an inferior
status in society.' To call attention to this in public is clearly deroga-
tory.0  Moreover, the two insults are interrelated. Augustino, as a
jadak, was subject to immediate and automatic expulsion from his lands
if the community found him to be a witch." 3 But quite apart from the
possible consequences of the accusations (which would have been more
significant had the action been grounded in defamation) the insults
were intrinsically injurious to dignity and had to be redressed. In
97 See, e.g., Othieno-Ochieng', Luo Social System 9-10 (1968); Southall, Lineage For-
mation Among the Luo 22 (1958). Where the slayer and victim are of the same lineage,
so that this solution is precluded by the rules of exogamy, the slayer may himself
marry a girl whose children are named after the deceased. Butt, The Nilotes o1 the
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Uganda 109 (1957). Isabella appears to be urging this
latter remedy, which is surprising since it accepts Augustino as a member of her son's
lineage, precisely the fact she was denying in calling him jadak.
98 Compare Northcote, "The Nilotic Kavirondo," 37 1. Afr. Soc. 58, 63 (1907) with
Wilson, "Homicide and Suicide Among the Joluo of Kenya," in Alrican Homicide and
Suicide, 179, 185, 188-89 (Bohannan ed. 1960).
90 According to one informant, such medicine can cause witchcraft to turn against
a man who uses it aggressively, and kill him.
100 Plural of jadak.
101 See Wilson, op. cit. supra note 87, at 56-62.
102 See, e.g., Kisumu DAC CC 180/66 (June 13, 1966) (300/- damages for being
called jadak, among other things). See also Evans-Pritchard, "Luo Tribes and Clans,"
7 Rhodes-Livingstone Journal 24, 37 (1949): "jadak is a harsh word." It was not,
however, defamatory because it was apparently true.
103 See Wilson, op. cit. supra note 87, at 87-88.
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seeking to do so Augustino was not only preserving his own self-
respect but also that of the ancestor after whom he was named and
whose spirit was believed to inhabit Augustino's body:
A person tends to be sensitive about his juok [ancestor name] and
"spoiling a name" is a serious matter. An insult is not merely an
insult to ego, it is also an insult to the ancestors with who [sic]
ego shares a common juok, and if the insult is not avenged, they
will be angry and punish the insulted man. While the origins of
the belief are now largely forgotten by the young, the sensitivity
remains .... "'
Luo do feel that the obligatory response to abuse, if honor is to be
protected, is counter-abuse or physical violence."'5 That Augustino did
not indulge in either may be due to a combination of causes including
fear of legal liability,' and a recognition that his accusers were only
women, irresponsible in the absence of their husband. But because
honor requires a vigorous reply to abuse the traditional mode of arbi-
tration by local elders is even less appropriate than violence since these
arbiters are ultimately powerless to extort redress. In the circum-
stances of the instant case, moreover, Augustino may have apprehended
that the clan elders would be biased against him, as an outsider. For
these reasons a demand for substantial civil damages.. allowed him
to vindicate his name promptly and effectively.
Augustino presented a strong case to the court. His own testimony
contained a clear, detailed, and internally consistent statement of the
facts on which he based his claim. More important, he produced an
independent eye-witness who generally corroborated his evidence. De-
spite minor contradictions-Augustino and his witness differed, for
instance, as to whether Augustino was present in Onyango's boma
at the start of the incident-Oburu's testimony carried conviction
through its wealth of additional detail, for example, the precise words
104 Whisson, The Will of God and the Wiles of Man 4-5 (1962) (cyclostyled paper
read at a conference of the East African Institute for Social Research at Limuru, Kenya,
in Jan. 1962). See also Southall, op. cit. supra note 97 at 25.
105 See Malo, Insult as an Offence in African Customary Law (n.d.) (microfilm,
library of African Law Section, School of Oriental and African Studies, London).
106 The development of African Courts has thus 'created' the civil action of insult in
two ways. Alternative methods of redress which were traditionally acceptable, counter-
abuse and violence, are no longer permissible, and compensation, for which there is
no precedent in tradition, is available.
107 The amount claimed was largely arbitrary, though comparable to that re-
quested in similar cases. The range is generally between one hundred and five
hundred shillings. See, e.g., Kisumu DAC CC 8/66 (Feb. 8, 1966) (150/-); Kisumu
DAC CC 5/66 (Jan. 12, 1966) (500/- against each defendant). Because the action is
not founded in custom there are no real standards. Courts will generally award the
amount claimed, as in this case, although judgments are sometimes reduced where the
insult is trivial or in some way justified. See, e.g., Kisumu DAC CC 394/66 (Nov. 24,
1966) (claim of 500/- reduced to judgment of 100/- because defendant was a young
boy unable to pay the full amount).
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of the defendants, and what Atieno was carrying. This confirmation
gained probative force from the fact that Oburu was required to wait
outside the court until he spoke: failure to obey this rule would have
led to his disqualification as a witness."0 8 Against Oburu, the defendants
could only counterpose two very weak witnesses, one of whom the
court quickly revealed as their close relative and member of their
boma. In relying on plaintiff's eye-witness and discounting the testi-
mony of the parties as well as that of defendants' relative the court was
making the implicit judgment, frequently found in the reasoning of
primary courts, that interested persons and their relatives can be ex-
pected to lie.'9 Equally significant is the court's observation that,
whereas the plaintiff specified the particulars of defendants' wrongful
conduct, the defendants contented themselves with general denials.
Facts, the court appears to have reasoned, must be met with facts, not
mere conclusions. The defendants may well have anticipated this
criticism for they offered an alibi, which was repeated by the first de-
fence witness. But the story they chose-that they had gone to Sakwa
to see their son immediately on hearing of his misfortune-was
irrelevant since they could easily have insulted Augustino before they
left.
In assessing the evidence the court did more than simply weigh the
quantities of independently corroborated factual detail on each side.
It employed as evidentiary rules perceptions about modal behavior in
Luo society, comparing conflicting allegations with the conduct which
it believed could be expected in the circumstances."' Both defendants
108 African Courts Civil Procedure Rules, §33 (n.d.): "The presiding member shall
then order the witnesses to withdraw from the court and shall ensure that no wit-
nesses hear the evidence given by the plaintiff, defendant or any other witness."
See Kericho DAC CC 16/66 (Mar. 10, 1966) (defense witness disqualified because
present during hearing).
109 Cf. African Courts Civil Procedure Rules, §49 (n.d.): "The judgment shall show
.. the evidence that the court believes and the evidence it does not believe."
110 In the analysis that follows I must acknowledge a debt, which anyone writing in
this field shares, to Max Gluckman, for introducing the fertile concept of the "reason-
able man" into legal anthropology in The judicial Process Among the Barotse of
Northern Rhodesia (1955). However, I believe that Gluckman's use of the term suffers
from some confusion between an evidentiary test of credibility and a substantive stan-
dard of right conduct. He writes: "Legal truth involves the assessment of what hap-
pened in terms of both legal and moral norms. For the judges have to find out who
has conformed with the law, and who has broken it . . . it is by these norms that the
judges examine and attack evidence." Id at 82. It is the primary task of a judge to
determine whether the defendant has conformed to the law. In doing so the court may
also make normative comments about the conduct of other parties and witnesses, and
these may well be as important in their social effect as the formal judgment. But
surely a judge does not make an "assessment of what happened" by measuring testi-
mony against "legal and moral norms" such as those quoted: "respect and help your
father," "treat your wife well." Ibid. The credibility of testimony rests on whether the
conduct asserted is typical behavior under the circumstances, not whether it is morally
correct. The evidentiary standard I employ, therefore, is one drawn from modal
behavior. Indeed, the perceptions about modal behavior that I find in the court's
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admitted receiving the news that their son was dead or dying, but
denied uttering cries of grief. The court explicitly rejected this conten-
tion as inconsistent with its own experience: mothers always cry when
they hear of the death of their children."' Thus the women, by foolishly
alleging a course of behavior that was inherently incredible, destroyed
the cogency of their subsequent defence. In answering this defence the
court relied on two further implicit perceptions. The first, that mothers
in their grief accuse those they believe responsible for their misfor-
tune,"' was not contested. But Atieno forcefully challenged any infer-
ence that she or her co-defendant would tend to name Augustino as
being responsible. And, even granting the court's first two perceptions,
what reasons were there for the defendants to malign Augustino? He
himself proffered none, and was forced to admit, in response to Atieno,
that he and Ogalo had harbored no grudges against each other which
could cause the defendants to suspect him. Nor, according to Atieno,
did she bear Augustino any hatred which would lead her to accuse
him falsely; she further contended that he had never entered her boma,
and hence could not have stimulated a spontaneous accusation.
Although the court never spoke to this issue, an explanation of the
defendants' motives is implicit in Augustino's allegation that he was
called a jadak as well as a witch. A jadak is by definition an alien, a
member of a foreign lineage; as such he is a potential enemy, viewed
with considerable suspicion. 1 The defendants, themselves members of
foreign natal clans by reason of the rules of exogamy,"' also oc-
cupied somewhat insecure positions,11 and thus had additional incen-
evaluation of the evidence are clearly not standards of right conduct. Nevertheless, I
still think that Gluckman's normative use of the concept of a reasonable man has
great value in understanding the nature of substantive standards in customary law.
Furthermore, he has since refined the concept of the reasonable man to recognize this
distinction. See Id. at 393 (2d ed. 1967).
11" Cf. Kisumu DAC CC 484/66 (Jan. 6, 1967) (court believed plaintiff's evidence
that defendant, at the funeral of her brother, accused plaintiff of having killed that
brother, another brother, and a brother's son by witchcraft). But cf. Kisumu DAC CC
371/66 (Oct. 25, 1966) (first defendant, husband of deceased, alleged to have cried out
accusations of witchcraft against plaintiff when he heard of death, but the court
believed the evidence of defendants that they merely expressed their sorrow over the
death).
112 See Whisson, The School in Present Day Luo Society 44, 47 (unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, Cambridge, 1963): "Death, it was said, could not be wholly for natural causes.
... Anyone with whom he [the deceased] had been in conflict might be cited as hav-
ing been responsible for the death. . . .Death was caused by supernatural means and
by the same means it should be avenged. The more important the man and his con-
nections, the greater the number of explanations for his death and the wider the
range of accusations would be. If the death was sudden and unexpected, more stories
would be spread."
113 "Distant clans were regarded as being close to enemies. In times of peace they
were treated as foreigners and in case of invasion they fought with spears [rather than
clubs] ." Othieno-Ochieng', op. cit. supra note 97, at 4.
114 See Southall, op. cit. supra note 97, at 20; Wilson, op. cit. supra note 87 at 137.
115 See Southall, op. cit. supra note 97, at 22: "the groups with which marriage is
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tive to fix the blame on Augustino. Moreover, at least one of the
defendants was the co-wife of Ogalo's mother, a relationship typically
characterized by rivalry.116 Misfortune suffered by the child of one
wife is most commonly attributed to the jealousy of another,"' in this
case the defendant, unless a more suitable suspect can be found. This
Augustino provided, not only as an outsider, but as the occupier of
badly needed land. Central Nyanza, one of the most densely populated
areas of Kenya,"' suffers from a significant land shortage. By accusing
Augustino, a jadak, of witchcraft, the women provided a ground for
his subsequent expulsion by the local clan. Thus they sought to shift
suspicion from themselves by appealing to the revanchist sentiments
of their husband's group."9 They may even have stood to benefit
materially from the redistribution of Augustino's holdings, since they
were his close neighbors. For this combination of reasons a jadak,
often the object of witchcraft accusations, was a particularly suitable
target here;"' the court may well have considered this in ignoring
Atieno's protestations that she lacked any motive to accuse Augustino.
Having found that the defendants did utter the insulting words in
plaintiff's presence, the court next had to pass on possible defences.
The defendants and their witnesses appear to have sought to convey
the impression that Ogalo had actually died, for it was only on cross-
examination that Atieno admitted that this did not in fact occur.
Augustino clearly feared that the court might be deceived on this
point, and conclude therefrom that the abuse was justified, for he took
great pains to emphasize that Ogalo was still very much alive and
missing from the village only because he was a fugitive from justice.
However, the court was not misled and hence did not have to answer
the very difficult question whether that death was caused by Augus-
tino's witchcraft. Moreover, the court was never confronted with the
less controversial issue, which was raised by the facts, whether a good
faith or reasonable belief by the women that Augustino had killed
Ogalo would constitute a defence. The defendants could not propose
possible tend to be those between whom hostility is the usual attitude. The Luo recognise
this correlation, and regard oche (in-laws) and wasigu (enemies) as almost inter-
changeable terms ..
116 Id. at 20.
11 See cases cited in Wilson, op. cit. supra note 98, at 191-92.
118 359 persons per square mile. This compares with a national density of 39. Nyanza
Province is the most densely populated of the whole country. See Kenya Census, 1962,
at 19, 20.
119 "[W] e find today in the overcrowded tribal areas considerable interlineage enmity
about land." Evans-Pritchard, op. cit. supra note 102, at 38.
120 It should not be thought, of course, that jodak are intentionally singled out for
false accusations of witchcraft in general or by the defendants in this case. Rather, a
functional interpretation of witchcraft requires not only that a belief in the existence of
supernatural phenomena be given an explanation in terms of social rather than physical
phenomena, but also that the identities of accuser and accused be understood in the
light of stresses in the social structure.
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this argument because they refused to concede that they had accused
Augustino, and to plead the defence merely hypothecating such a con-
cession would probably appear to a legally unsophisticated court to
constitute that very admission. Nevertheless, the reiteration in the testi-
mony of defendants and defence witnesses that defendants did receive
a letter warning of their son's imminent death, and did believe it to
the extent of going straight to Sakwa to investigate (a journey of many
hours) may be seen as an attempt to put forward evidence of at least a
good faith belief in their son's death. In ignoring this belief as a
possible defence, the court may have been following Augustino's
implicit distinction between the precipitate, and thus unjustified,
charges by the two women and their husband's more cautious reaction
in organizing a careful investigation of the incident at Sakwa.
When viewed against the background of available ethnography this
case report is a fertile source of hypotheses about law, though of course
these must still be tested against numerous other disputes before general
principles can be induced. Where a rule-directed inquiry might have
produced an abstract statement of the wrong--"compensation is paid
for abuse"--attention to the details of this case illuminates the social
environment in which the wrong occurred. We learn that the "mothers"
of a young man, upon hearing that he had been suddenly injured
and might die, uttered witchcraft accusations against a near neighbor
who is a jadak. Available remedies are not merely listed as fungible
alternatives: counter-abuse, assault, arbitration, civil action for dam-
ages; the choice made under the circumstances of this case provides
some data indicating when certain remedies are chosen, and why. 2'
Existing biases cannot be dispelled by a mode of inquiry, but the case
method does help to reveal them and thus avoid their consequences. An
investigator working, perforce, with an elderly informant who reported
only traditional conduct might never have learned of the wrong of
insult even though it constitutes a substantial portion of the work of
the primary courts. On the other hand, the case lawyer is immediately
alerted to the prestige accorded anything connected with English law
by these courts. But this negative ethnocentrism, unlike the elder's
blindness towards change, is a significant element of the contemporary
legal system, and an analysis of the case reveals the precise extent of
English influence: the language may be that of the common law, but
the elements of the action are unmistakably indigenous. An interroga-
tor might well have been too easily content with the discovery that his
121 See A. L. Epstein, "The Case Method in the Field of Law," in The Craft of
Social Anthropology 205, 227-28 (Epstein ed. 1967): "the problem is not merely to
distinguish and classify the various types of sanction, but to establish the relationship
between them. In what kinds of situation is a particular kind of sanctioh likely to be
invoked and why, indeed, within one social system are so many different kinds of
redressive mechanism necessary?"
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terminology-defamation-coincided with that of his informant to
inquire further. Finally, the case suggested indigenous formulations
of other legal rules, auxiliary to the general principle of compensation
for abuse, which an investigator might not have thought to elicit nor
an informant to volunteer. These were both evidentiary: how is con-
flicting testimony to be balanced, how is credibility to be tested; and
substantive: what constitutes justification for abuse.
Wrongs are not only redressed by the payment of money compensa-
tion; other remedies are also significant. The following two cases il-
lustrate how a husband employed the traditional remedy of witchcraft
to control an unfaithful wife, and how she then sought protection from
the primary courts by means of an action for divorce and a private
prosecution for witchcraft. The participants are all Gusii.'22
Plaintiff/Complainant: Agnes, Kitutu location, Kisii District
Defendant/Accused: Barnabas, Kitutu location, Kisii District
CASE 1123
Claim: divorce. (Filed August 24, 1966)
Plaintiff: Barnabas married me and we had good love. After I had stayed with
him for three months they started to show me witchcraft documents. Barnabas'
mother told me to listen to her but I refused. When the witchcraft exhibit was
brought down from the house called irongo it was a skull in a basket. I went
out of the house and started saying that I am not listening to them. Barnabas
took my underwear and hid it. Then he told me he did not want me because
I would not listen to him, and he chased me and said he would come and
ask for his cattle. My father told him to wait until I remarried. When Bar-
nabas chased me I stayed with my sister. Barnabas and three others came
and took me by force; I agreed to go because he was my husband. When we
reached his home he caught me and shaved my head and pubic hair and then
they chased me. I did not sleep that day. I returned to my father and told
him what they had done.
(examined by defendant): You showed me witchcraft at midnight when you
called me in your mother's house. There were two of you who shaved me
at home.
(examined by court): I cried out when they were shaving me but no one
came because it was 7 p.m. and raining. The child does not belong to
Barnabas because I was pregnant when I went to him. I stayed with him for
eight months. They had some dried out skulls and some fresh heads.
Plaintiff's witness, Moseti: I agree that Agnes, my daughter, should divorce
Barnabas. They showed her witchcraft documents (ibinto biorogi); he
shaved her hair even on her private parts. Since I have been [alive?] I have
never seen people doing such practice. I asked Barnabas to go and bring the
clothes which he took from my daughter, and the hair which he shaved off
her. He took her young child from her but returned it after three days.
112 The Gusii are a Bantu tribe which numbered just over 500,000 in 1962. See
Kenya Census, 1962, at 36. They live in Kisii District (a European corruption of the
tribal name), Nyanza Province, between the Luo on their west, and the Kipsigis and
Masai on their north, east and south. Again, for reasons stated earlier, see note 81
supra, I have deleted the village and sublocations of the parties, and replaced the
names of parties and witnesses by what I hope are appropriate pseudonyms.
123 Kisii DAC CC 342/66 (Oct. 5, 1966).
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(examined by defendant): My daughter's hair which you took was very long.
You were three people when you shaved her.
(examined by court): The child does not belong to Barnabas because when
my daughter went to him she was pregnant.
Defendant: I do not want to divorce my wife. One day when I returned from
school I found her missing. Then I heard that she had been taken by some-
one. I went to her father who said she was with her sister. I wenC there and
took her home. But she left after one day, leaving her child behind. I sent
my boy to take the child to her.
(examined by plaintiff): I never helped my mother to bring down the
basket which contains witchcraft documents.
Judgment: It is very bad for a man to marry a girl and then show her witchcraft
unknown to her parents. According to Kisii Law Panel Minutes 3(b)(1)
124
divorce shall be granted if one of the parties practices witchcraft. This was
proved by the plaintiff who saw the witchcraft documents. The divorce is
granted with [66/-] costs. The defendant can claim the child in a civil suit.
Court: the case is adjourned a week. The defendant is to bring the clothes and
hair which he took. He will be prosecuted for failure to comply. [A week
later the defendant had failed to bring these articles and was prosecuted by
the court.]
CASE 2125
Charge: pretending to exercise witchcraft, contra section 2 of the Witchcraft
Act.1 26 (Filed September 6, 1966.)
Complainant: I was at my sister's home. The accused came and took me to his
home. He was with two other men, Nyamao and Oroko. He took me on
2 September. He is my husband. He bought the men pombe.127 After drink-
ing the pombe the defendant caught hold of me while Omwayo shaved me.
He shaved my head and my pubic hair. He shaved me with a pair of scissors.
The accused kept the hair. The accused chased me that night at 10 p.m.,
after taking my child from me. I went to my home. After two days I came
to charge him. He shaved me at 7 p.m.
(examined by accused): You chased me at night after the other men left.
(examined by court): You can see that my head is shaved. I did not tell any-
body at the accused's home about this. I told my father. I accused him so
that he may return my hair and knickers to me.
Complainant's witness, Makore: Agnes is my sister-in-law [wife's sister]. She had
gone to visit me. After two days the accused came to collect her on 2 Sep-
tember. He took her away. At about 7 a.m. the next day she returned to me.
124 Kisii Law Panel, Minutes of Meetings held at Kisii on Dec. 10-11, 1962, C, Law
of Marriage; 7, Dissolution; A, Divorce; 3, Grounds; (a) by wife; (1) witchcraft
(Oborogi). "A woman may divorce her husband if he is a witch as understood in the
Kisii sense, or if he has been convicted of witchcraft under the Witchcraft Ord." See
Cotran, Restatement of A/rican Law: Vol. 1: Kenya: The Law of Marriage and
Divorce 69 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Cotran].
125 Kisii DAC CrC 1288/66 (Oct. 19, 1966).
126 Laws of Kenya, cap. 67 (rev. ed. 1962). "Any person who holds himself out as a
witch-doctor able to cause fear, annoyance or injury to another in mind, person or
property, or who pretends to exercise any kind of supernatural power, witchcraft, sorcery
or enchantment calculated to cause such fear ... shall be guilty of an offence and liable
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years." The Kisii District African
Court, by its warrant, was not permitted to impose sentences of imprisonment exceed-
ing twelve months.
127 Native beer (Swahili).
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Her head was shaved. She told me that the accused and two other men had
shaved her.
Complainant (re-examined by court): The accused said he did not want me,
but that the hair was his cattle.
Accused: Agnes left my home on 25 July. I discovered this when I returned from
school. She took her bedding and utensils. On 28 July she went and eloped
[sic] 128 another man, Mosigisi. I found her there. The man is here in court.
Mosigisi wanted to fight me. They chased me. Agnes ran away and returned
to her sister's. On 2 September I went and collected her. The next day at about
7:30 a.m. she left me and returned to her parents. She left the child behind.
I did not shave my wife.
(examined by complainant): You wanted to hit me with a piece of piping.
Accused's witness, Nyamao: We collected Agnes from her sister's. The next morn-
ing Barnabas told me that she had deserted.
(examined by complainant): We did not shave you.
[Accused's witnesses, Oroko and Omwayo gave the same testimony as Nyamao.]
Judgment. When Agnes appeared before the court on 4 October her hair was
quite short. Her sister's husband testified that her hair was shaven when he
saw her on 3 September. The accused does not deny that Agnes was shaved.
We have no doubt that she was shaved. She was deserting her husband. He
took her back to him. It was on this evening that he shaved her head and
private hair to frighten her so that she may not leave him. Agnes would be
afraid of being bewitched by the accused if she left him. He would use her
hair to bewitch her. This has been a practice with the Kisii husbands whose
wives tried to desert them. This court can infer that this is the practice the
accused employed to frighten his wife. We find him guilty.
Sentence: 40/- fine or two months imprisonment, and to pay 16/- court fees to
the complainant. [Barnabas paid the fine in full.]
As in the Luo case the entire record, here of two interrelated contro-
versies must be analyzed as a whole. This time I will be less concerned
with unravelling the reasoning of the court, which is plainly stated,
and more intent to appreciate the legal tactics employed by each party
to advance facts and imply interpretations favorable to his case. A
brief chronology of events whose occurrence was not contested may be
a useful preface to the wildly divergent stories told by husband and
wife.
December 1965: Barnabas and Agnes were married
July 25, 1966 : Agnes left Barnabas
Augusf 24 : Agnes sued Barnabas for divorce
September 2 : Barnabas took Agnes from her sister's husband's home
128 African dialect usage of English verbs can sometimes be quite revealing about the
nature of responsibility for the act described. The effect here is to transform the
woman-in English a passive accomplice who "elopes with" a man-into a responsible
agent who "elopes" the man. This is particularly remarkable in light of the fact that
most dialect changes emphasize the active role of the man. In Kenya a man "wombs,"
"pregnants," or "conceives" a girl; proper usage would speak of a woman becoming
pregnant, or conceiving. Similarly, in Kenya, a man "engages" a girl; in English she
becomes engaged. These modifications may be a consequence of assimilating English to
Swahili grammar. In the latter, a man marries a woman (ku-oa, an active verb), but
she is married by him (ku-olewa, a passive form); both men and women marry in
English.
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September 3 Agnes returned to her father
September 6 Agnes filed a private prosecution against Barnabas under the
Witchcraft Act
October 5 Divorce granted
October 19 Barnabas convicted under the Witchcraft Act
Agnes had no children at the time of her marriage to Barnabas
which itself suggests that she was quite young and that she had almost
certainly not been married before. Gusii girls marry early, so that Agnes
was probably no more than fifteen."' Nevertheless, she alleged that she
had become pregnant before marriage. This may well have been true
since premarital intercourse is common."' Indeed, her parents may have
rushed her into the marriage in order to conceal such a pregnancy
which could, if discovered, reduce the bridewealth they were expect-
ing 1 and might have even more serious consequences if her lover
were of her own exogamous group."' But whether or not the allegation
was true it is surprising that Agnes should have made such an em-
barrassing admission in court, and even more so that her father should
corroborate testimony apparently impugning his daughter's character.
The most likely motive for the assertion was to establish that Barnabas
was not the father of the child, and thus to defeat the right a man
usually has upon divorce to the custody of children born to his wife
during marriage."' Although Barnabas was clearly anxious to keep
the child he did not challenge the allegation. Perhaps he was too pre-
occupied with avoiding the divorce and hoped that his wife's admis-
sion would constitute some evidence of her promiscuous character, on
which he planned to base the justification for the acts with which he
was charged. His caution did no harm for the court, following com-
mon practice,"' deferred the issue of paternity to another case, recog-
nizing that there were enough complications already.
"2 R. LeVine and B. LeVine, Nyansongo: a Gusii Community in Kenya 41 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Nyansongo]. A man is at least eighteen to twenty when he
marries-older if his father is poor and cannot afford the high bridewealth-which
would make Christopher considerably more mature; there is also some evidence that
he was a schoolteacher, and thus educated and westernized.
130 Ibid.
,"'1 P. Mayer, "Bridewealth Limitation among the Gusii," in Two Studies in Applied
Anthropology in Kenya 19, 21 (1951).
132 Nyansongo at 42-43.
133 p. Mayer, Gusii Bridewealth Law and Custom 57-58 (1950); cf., COR Appl. 5/53
(Dec. 11, 1953).
"" The approach of primary courts contrasts strikingly with that of traditional coun-
cils of elders in this regard. In the past, any arbitration called to decide a single issue
would quickly be expanded to consider all outstanding disputes between the parties and
among their relatives in an effort to promote a more general and lasting settlement.
Contemporary primary courts, because of their greater powers of enforcement, do not
need to obtain the agreement of the litigants to the decision. Therefore, they seek to
narrow the issue as far as possible so as to limit the evidence and facilitate decision. See,
e.g., Kiambu Mag. CA 188/66 (Mar. 22, 1967), allowing appeal from Limuru AC CC
626/66 (n.d.). Plaintiff brought a claim for compensation for illegitimate pregnancy
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Agnes conceded that she had lived happily with Barnabas for three
months, but complained that he and his mother had then begun in-
structing her in the unnatural mysteries of witchcraft. When she tried
to protect her innocence by refusing to listen he used his nefarious
powers to threaten her, taking underwear which he could use to be-
witch her."' Did any of this actually happen? LeVine, an anthropologist
who spent two years in Gusiiland, observes that it is difficult to deter-
mine the empirical foundation of beliefs in witchcraft activities because
witchcraft is almost never admitted by those accused, and rarely even
discussed openly. His conclusion is:
there are some women who believe themselves witches and per-
form some of the acts customarily attributed to them. However,
even if this is true of -certain Gusii women, it seems obvious that
the beliefs and images of the average Gusii concerning witches go
far beyond the facts which can be empirically ascertained. "6
Whether Agnes actually perceived the acts she described, or offered
a naive and fearful interpretation of ambiguous behavior, or simply
invented a fictitious story, there were substantial reasons why she should
feel considerable hostility towards her husband and his mother, and
why she should express it in terms of witchcraft. A girl's first months of
marriage are a time of great strain. She has been uprooted from her
home, family, and friends while still young, probably for the first time,
and sent to live in a foreign clan (eamate) among people she has been
brought up to regard as enemies."' There she is placed under the con-
trol of her husband's mother, on whom she is dependent for food and
in whose home she must cook and eat. Although she is treated courte-
ously her insecurity is manifest in her eagerness to do household and
agricultural chores so as to earn the approval of her new home.'88
Sexual relations with her husband are probably unhappy for he has
consummated their marriage on the first night with a prodigious dis-
play of sadistic virility and continues to view coitus as an occasion for
inflicting pain." 9 There are few outlets through which a newly
married wife can express the hostility thus generated. Physical aggres-
sion is quite generally condemned in Gusii culture, 4 ° and unthinkable
with respect to three children allegedly fathered by the defendant with plaintiff's
daughter. He conceded that defendant had paid some brideprice, which defendant
sought to raise as a setoff against the claim. The court nevertheless deferred this counter-
claim to another case.
185 R. LeVine, "Witchcraft and Sorcery in a Gusii Community," in Witchcraft and
Sorcery in East Africa 221, 228 (Middleton and Winters ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited
as Witchcraft].
116 Id. at 229-30.
187 p. Mayer, The Lineage Principle in Gusii Society 10 (1949).
138 Nyansongo 51-52.
"19 Id. at 47-48, 54, 191.
140 Id. at 156-57.
1969]
HeinOnline  -- 17 Am. J. Comp. L. 601 1969
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
towards a husband or mother-in-law, whom a wife must treat with
respect and obedience."' The same norms inhibit the display of aggres-
sion through abuse, though less strongly;' 4' but vituperation is in any
case an unrewarding weapon where one's audience is unfriendly and
withholds its support.
Two alternative means remain to the Gusii wife to express her un-
happiness. The first is an accusation of witchcraft. Although this
would fall within the category of impermissible abuse if made before
the general public, 4 ' it is privileged if made to an appropriate au-
thority;... Agnes was careful here to confine her charges to the courts in
which she brought her two actions. Gusii give recognition to the pre-
dicament of a young wife in their belief that such women are generally
subjected to the lure of witchcraft by their mothers-in-law. Instruction
in witchcraft partakes of all the horror of the practice itself. Gusii assert
that it is difficult to resist an invitation to learn, and that to interrupt
tutelage once begun may lead to illness or insanity. Yet to attain the
status of a witch is even more terrible, for a novice is required to
sacrifice her own child to the greed of her fellow-witches, and ulti-
mately gains her infernal powers only at the expense of all friendship
and respect in the community.' Agnes' accusation of her mother-in-
law was thus culturally sanctioned. Her accusation of Barnabas fol-
lowed naturally, for a witch is even more successful in seducing her
own children to the craft than she is in enticing her daughters-in-law.'46
These allegations also laid the foundation for the other, more total
14' Id. at 21-23, 51-52.
142 Id. at 157.
14 See Kisii DAC CC 64/66 (Feb. 14, 1966) (100/- compensation awarded against
defendant on his admission that he had called plaintiff a witch who had killed his
child). But see Kisii DAC CC 47/66 (Mar. 16, 1966) (plaintiff alleged that defendant
had called her an adultress, and claimed 200/- compensation; the court dismissed her
claim as based on mere vulgar abuse uttered during a quarrel).
144 See Kisii DAC CC 87/66 (Oct. 19, 1966). The defendant here believed that
plaintiff had killed one of his children by witchcraft, and that two others were
threatened with a similar fate. He reported this to the sub-chief, and repeated the
charge at public meetings called by the sub-chief, at which plaintiff refused to appear.
The court dismissed plaintiff's claim of 400/-, stating: "The sub-chief is a government
servant who, when he receives a report of anything, is under a duty to investigate. ...
when the defendant's three children died [sic] he suspected that man [the plaintiff]
and reported to the sub-chief. The sub-chief summoned the parties and investigated.
Then the two other children of defendant, who were seriously ill, recovered. This is
no defamation of name. For example, if the defendant could go and announce this
matter where there were many people and not including the sub-chief, the court might
think that the defendant defamed plaintiff's name. But on this we have found that
the defendant did not use the name of plaintiff in a bad way." LeVine notes that
appeal to authority as the preferred means of dispute settlement is an integral part of
the Gusii personality structure. Nyansongo at 186.
145 Witchcraft at 229.
146 Id. at 228.
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solution to the conflicts in Agnes' position, to which she was later driven,
namely divorce."'
Not only did Agnes' description of her marital discord tally with
Gusii conceptions about the early course of marriage, but the details in
her recitation of the witchcraft practices of her affines-the midnight
tryst, a basket containing fresh heads and dried out skulls-also coin-
cided with the ascribed behavior of such persons. 4 Indeed, Agnes
appeared to rely on the archetypicality of this part of her story to
convince the court, since she offered little other persuasive evidence.
Her father's testimony about the "witchcraft documents," like his con-
firmation that Barnabas had taken Agnes' underwear, could clearly be
no more than hearsay repetition of Agnes' own story. She also failed
to call the only eye-witness, Barnabas' mother. Even so, her father's
support for charges of witchcraft likely to result in a divorce, to which
he would normally be opposed, did carry some weight. And she could
draw upon the later threats of witchcraft, for which there was con-
siderable evidence, to lend credence to this earlier incident. In offering
all this testimony Agnes' primary intent was to portray herself as an
innocent dutiful wife, tormented without provocation by husband and
mother-in-law even to the point of being seduced into and threatened
with witchcraft.
This was not at all the gloss put upon events by Barnabas. His testi-
mony, questions and witnesses tended to show Agnes as a disobedient,
unfaithful wife and himself as the indulgent, forgiving husband. Her
accusations of witchcraft were simply a fabrication intended to justify
a divorce and leave her free to chase other men. Barnabas could find
some evidence that the allegations had been concocted as a justification
after the fact in Agnes' delay in making them: she remained with him
five months after learning about the witchcraft, and waited yet an-
other month after deserting before suing for divorce. At the same time,
Barnabas did not unequivocally deny these charges. Though he dis-
avowed participation in his mother's midnight witchcraft practices he
did not deny that they occurred. Perhaps he feared to diminish the
force of his argument by opposing such a widely held belief that
women teach their daughters-in-law witchcraft; moreover, his mother's
character by itself could not sustain a divorce or penal sanctions. But
this cannot explain his failure to controvert his wife's allegation that he
had taken her underwear. The contrast between Barnabas' outright
denial of any part in the first witchcraft incident and his admission by
default of the second suggests that there might have been a distinction
147 Divorce is quite common during the first year of marriage, which is viewed as a
trial period. A wife generally visits her parents within the first three months, and
often tries to persuade them then not to send her back to her husband. Nyansongo at
49; P. Mayer, Gusii Bridewealth Law and Custom 50-51 (1950).
148 Witchcraft at 226-28.
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in his mind, which he was trying to imply to the court, between un-
motivated, purely malicious witchcraft, and the justified use of witch-
craft. If he had taken Agnes' underwear it was not to coerce her into
becoming a witch but to deter her from adultery and desertion. In
support of this construction Barnabas offered persuasive evidence that
Agnes had not been driven from his home but had run away volun-
tarily. She had left in his absence and had taken all her belongings,
something which no husband would allow. and which indicated that
she did not intend to return. Barnabas had gone to her father to ask
her to come back only to learn she was not there but had, after an
indecently short time, gone to live with another man. This couple were
now so morally depraved that when Barnabas went to demand his
wife both of them violated fundamental Gusii norms, Mosigisi offering
a fight and Agnes threatening her own husband with a piece of pipe.
Agnes, naturally, did not allow this story to stand unchallenged.
She had not run away, though the presence and threats of witchcraft
might well be reason to do so. It was her husband who had told her to
leave because she would not become a witch. He had further asserted
that he would reclaim his bridewealth cattle, and after driving her
away had visited her father for this sole purpose. Her father could
hardly compel her to remain with such a man and agreed to the
divorce which Barnabas had demanded.
Although an unqualified choice cannot be made between the com-
peting interpretations, the evidence on balance appears to support
Barnabas. Agnes must have left voluntarily, without her husband's
knowledge, since she did not deny taking her belongings. Moreover,
had he chased her, he would not have followed her to her father's
after only three days. There is good reason to believe that she had
formed an attachment with another man, either prior to her departure
or shortly thereafter. She seems in fact to have been living with him,
since she was not at her father's, and her allegation that she stayed
with her sister was contradicted by her sister's husband, who testified
that she had been there only two days when her husband recovered
her. While living with this man she sued her husband for divorce.
Though most Gusii fathers would try to preserve a daughter's mar-
riage... so as to retain the brideprice, Moseti advocated a divorce. He
may well have been motivated principally by a genuine fear for his
daughter's safety, but this sentiment by itself would probably not have
149 See, e.g., Kisii DAC CC 3/66 (June 17, 1966). Plaintiff sued defendant for tak-
ing certain clothing. Defendant admitted doing so; he had eloped with plaintiff's sister
and when the girl left him she had stolen the clothing, which he had gone and taken
back. See also Kisii DAC CC 131/66 (May 9, 1966). Plaintiff here sued the sons of his
former wife for assisting her in taking her goods when she deserted him one night.
190 Nyansongo at 49.
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been sufficient to overcome pecuniary considerations without the expec-
tation of a second brideprice."5'
Why, then, did Barnabas not make a more determined effort to
prove Agnes' adultery with this man, thereby justifying himself?
Why did he fail to call Mosigisi as a witness since he claimed that
Mosigisi was actually present in court? The reason lies in the legal
dilemma in which Barnabas found himself. He wanted to keep his wife,
and yet any defense he made to her charges could lead the court to
grant the divorce. If he argued that Agnes had left him for Mosigisi
then the court might reason, as it in fact did, that Barnabas had chosen
the response of a typical Gusii husband and threatened his wife with
witchcraft. The court might then dismiss Agnes' story of the pot of
skulls, but would still find grounds for divorce in Barnabas' threat to
use his wife's underwear to bewitch her. If Barnabas concealed his sus-
picions of adultery, then the most probable cause of her desertion was
that he and his mother were witches. Were this to be believed, Barnabas
would not only lose Agnes, but find it nearly impossible to obtain
another wife. 5 And if Barnabas successfully convinced the court that
Agnes had had no reason to leave, it might conclude that he had
chased her away, another adequate ground for divorce. 5 Barnabas
compromised with this problem by offering a weak presentation of all
three possibilities. Agnes, too, was in an ambiguous situation. If she
insisted on her moral purity, then the only evidence of witchcraft was
her uncorroborated testimony of the midnight ceremony. If she ad-
mitted that her husband's use of witchcraft. was motivated by her own
unfaithfulness, then the court might disregard her whole complaint
as the fabrication of an adulteress seeking the freedom to run after
other men. Agnes chose to maintain her own innocence; fortunately,
the court did not believe her.
When Agnes left Barnabas, he followed her to her father after a few
days, seeking an early reconciliation. But upon learning that she had
gone to live with another man he took no immediate further action,
obeying Gusii norms which urged that he avoid a confrontation that
151 Brideprice or bridewealth is a transfer of property from the family of the groom
to the family of the bride which, among the Gusii, is essential to the validity of the
marriage and necessary to establish a man's rights to his wife's children. In 1951 the
amount was 12-16 cows, one bull and 12-18 goats. P. Mayer, "Bridewealth Limitation
among the Gusii," in Two Studies in Applied Anthropology in Kenya 19, 25 (1951).
The assurance of another suitor for Agnes meant at least that Moseti would suffer no
loss from the divorce. He might even have anticipated a gain, for Mosigisi may have
been prepared to pay a higher amount than Barnabas has given. In any case, Moseti
would have had the temporary use of two brideprices and might, like many Gusii
fathers, delay considerably before completing the return of the first. See Nyansongo
at 49.
152 Nyansongo at 45-46.
153 See Kisii Law Panel, op. cit. supra note 124, at C.7.A.3.b.4.
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could only lead to an open conflict."' Time might work a solution,
and Agnes might return to him on her own. Notice that she had filed
an action for divorce showed this hope to be vain. Threatened with
the permanent loss of his wife, he surprised the couple and in a heated
controversy succeeded in driving Agnes away from Mosigisi. He
traced Agnes to her father and then to her sister's husband and took her
back to his home. However, harmony could not be re-established, and
she left him again.
The versions which the litigants gave of the events of the nights of
September 2-3 were consistent with the legal strategies each had
adopted. Agnes alleged, with apparent inconsistency, both that she
went with her husband voluntarily and that he and two other men
took her by force. Either situation could be turned to her advantage:
the former to show her as the obedient wife, the latter to dramatize
her husband's wrongful intentions. After the men had drunk beer to
nerve themselves her husband held her while his brother shaved her.
Then the other men left; her husband took the child from her and
drove her out into the night. Barnabas admitted that he had brought
his wife home, but not that he had shaved her. She had persisted in
her disobedience and had run away again the next morning, abandon-
ing her child, which he voluntarily returned three days later.
Agnes' evidence was considerably more persuasive. First, there was
the indisputable fact that her head had been shaved. The court could
see this for itself, and indeed commented on her short hair. Real evi-
dence often has a disproportionate effect in primary courts:"' for in-
stance, cattle trespass may be proved by producing a broken maize
plant, or an assault by the rock alleged to have been thrown. The
shaving was also corroborated. by witnesses; not only Agnes' father,
who could be expected to lie in her behalf, but also her sister's husband,
154 Nyansongo at 76-78: "unsociability . . . is itself a reaction to aggression, and the
preferred method of handling it."
155 See, e.g., Kisii DAC CC 103/66 (May 17, 1966); Kisii DAC CC 39/66 (Feb. 4,
1966). In the first case plaintiff claimed compensation for bedding and clothing which
he alleged defendant's cattle had eaten. He produced in court the remains of a
blanket and sheet, and stated that another blanket and two shirts had been entirely
consumed. The court allowed damages only for the articles shown to it, stating: "We
cannot assume that the same cattle had eaten the [other] blanket and shirts." In the
second case, plaintiff sued defendant for assault, seeking compensation for a torn shirt
and vest. He testified that his wife had used the shirt to make clothing for his children.
The court dismissed the action, stating: "Although he [plaintiff] alleged that his
shirt was torn, he did not produce the shirt itself, but he showed a shirt of his
child which had been sewn by his wife from that which had been torn." See also
Tononoka AC CC 180/66 (Oct. 10, 1966). Plaintiff sued defendant for assault, claiming
that defendant had bit off part of her ear. She produced the piece in court, which
clearly impressed the judges, who stated: "Since the ear was normal before the fight
and it is not shown that it was injured apart from the fight, the court finds that
defendant did bite it. The court has examined the ear and found that a portion is bit
off." The real evidence here appears to have shifted the burden of proof from plaintiff
to defendant.
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member of another lineage and hence less biased, who in addition had
seen Agnes just before and after the incident. All that remained was
a link between Barnabas and the shaving, which the court itself was
able to deduce from circumstantial evidence combined with its
knowledge of the modal behavior of Gusii husbands. Second, it was
clear that Agnes had been driven away by Barnabas that same night.
There were no eye-witnesses, since his brother and friends had already
left, but again circumstantial evidence was conclusive. That her depar-
ture had occurred at night was confirmed by her brother-in-law,
Makore, who testified that she arrived at his home at an hour which
would have required her to travel during the night. Gusii are extremely
fearful of being out alone at night, when witches are omnipresent.'
Agnes would not have ventured to do so voluntarily under normal
circumstances; the coercion must have been considerable for her to brave
the dark immediately after being threatened with witchcraft. Further-
more, Agnes left her infant child behind; few mothers would do so
freely, and none would willingly entrust her baby to a man she believed
to be a witch." 7 Barnabas' answer was extremely feeble. He did not
even attempt to deny that his wife had been shaved. His bare disavowal
of personal responsibility was merely reiterated by his alleged ac-
complices, all of which testimony was suspect as being self-exculpatory.
The allegation that Agnes had deserted the following morning could
not even draw upon such self-serving declarations; his witnesses only
repeated what Barnabas himself had told them.
The motivation and significance of an act is inevitably more ambigu-
ous than the act itself, but the evidence available here does permit an
interpretation of the events of this case, based on the above reconstruc-
tion. Barnabas took his wife home on September 2 impelled by a com-
plex of conflicting emotions: he sought to reassert his authority, chal-
lenged by her elopement with Mosigisi; to punish her disobedience;
and to frighten her into future submission. His ultimate aim was
reconciliation, a return to the "good love" they had had originally.
Agnes' willingness to accompany him must have encouraged this
hope. But his strategy backfired, frightening Agnes into revulsion
rather than submission. Threat and repulsion fed on each other until
Barnabas was driven to employ a technique which, past experience
suggested, would terrify her. He shaved her hair and kept the shavings,
exuviae traditionally capable of being used to bewitch the person from
whom they come. 8 This was the most potent means he possessed to
156 Nyansongo at 146; Witchcraft at 226.
15T The attachment between a mother and child is very strong, and mothers generally
make vigorous efforts to retain their children upon divorce, as shown by the number
of appeals dealing with this issue which reach the highest court. See, e.g., COR Appl.
4/53 (Dec. 10, 1953); COR Appl. 5/53 (Dec. 11, 1953).
158 Witchcraft at 128.
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retain his wife. In addition, the act had symbolic value. As the court
observed, such shaving is a practice among Gusii husbands. A woman
with a shaved head would be publicly branded by the Gusii equivalent
of a "scarlet letter" as a disobedient wife and suspected adulteress. The
same construction could be expressed by another symbolic route. 1. A
woman who has committed adultery must acknowledge the error to
her husband in order that she may be purified before she sleeps with
him again; failure to do so may cause his death.' 2. The head of a
widow is shaved. 6 ° Agnes' bald head may thus have stigmatized her as
a prospective widow, a woman who had sought to kill her husband by
willful refusal to admit her adultery. Shaving Agnes' pubic hair, how-
ever, was an act without traditional precedent. Even her father testi-
fied with horror that he had never heard of such a practice. I can find
no direct explanation in the ethnographic literature with which I am
familiar.' Analogies with the shaving of her head and with the
retention of her underwear suggest strongly that these cuttings too
were to be used to threaten witchcraft more specifically contingent
upon a recurrence of adultery.
Barnabas himself indicated an additional symbolism of the shaved
hair: it was his cattle and represented the return of bridewealth. Yet
despite this implicit act of divorce Barnabas' efforts were consistently
directed at keeping his wife. Even when she was driven by his be-
havior and threats to seek protection from her relatives he retained
her child in the hope of enticing her back. Only when Agnes prosecuted
him for witchcraft did he begin to perceive that strong-arm tactics
produced terror, not respect. Then he surrendered the child, fearing
that his custody might be construed as one more attempt to threaten
its mother, and further that any misfortune to the delicate infant
would constitute ultimate proof of his witchcraft.
For Agnes to bring a private prosecution against her husband under
the Witchcraft Act was a highly unusual step for several reasons. First,
159Nyansongo at 100-01. In Kisii DAC CC 47/66 (Mar. 16, 1966) plaintiff sued
defendant for defamation alleging that defendant had accused her of committing
adultery, and thereby killing her husband through supernatural means. The court
accepted that this accusation of "amasangia" was recognized by Gusii belief, but found
that plaintiff had not proved that the accusation had been made.
160 Nyansongo at 94.
161 One incident, however, is suggestive. As mentioned earlier, sexual relations
among the Gusii are permeated by aggression. Not only does a man seek to inflict
pain during intercourse, a wife generally tries to avoid intercourse, and in particular
attempts to frustrate it on her wedding night. LeVine tells of a girl who was found to
have knotted her pubic hair so that her husband was unable to achieve penetration for
a week, until this was discovered and the hair cut with a razor blade. Nyansongo at 48.
Assuming that Barnabas and Agnes had not escaped the endemic sexual conflict, shav-
ing Agnes' pubic hair may have been another expression of sexual hostility, perhaps
symbolic of her accessibility to other men. The presence of Barnabas' brother and
friends was also a means of shaming Agnes, for Gusii women are generally extremely
modest. Nyansongo at 142-43, 170-72.
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the practice of witchcraft is commonly dealt with by traditional, extra-
legal methods; only the circumstances of this case rendered these pro-
cedures inappropriate. In the past, when a community had been able
to reach agreement on the guilt of a witch, it might act together to kill
him or drive him away.' But today resort to self-help is illegal, and
consequently increasingly rare."'8 Moreover, a woman who married
into the village from a foreign lineage could never instigate such
action against her own husband. Agnes could have obtained the as-
sistance of certain quasi-legal specialists in anti-witchcraft medicine:
the sorcerer (omonyamosira) who kills the witch by magic, or the
witch-smeller (omoriori) who discovers and removes witchcraft sub-
stances. 4 Yet such men were impotent here, since Barnabas had sub-
jected his wife to the threat of witchcraft, but had not yet exercised his
powers. Second, the easiest and most effective way for a wife to protect
herself against affines she believed were bewitching her was desertion
and divorce. But pursuit of this remedy had only infuriated her hus.
band, -driving him to increase his threats and thus aggravating her
terrors rather than relieving them. Third, married women do not
frequently resort to the courts, and almost never sue their husbands,
except for divorce. 5 But Agnes' legal representative under ordinary
circumstances, her husband, was of course disqualified. In marital dis-
putes a woman's agnatic kin may conduct an informal arbitration with
her affines; Agnes' father, on at least two occasions, did seek to per-
suade Barnabas to abandon his threats. But persuasion was ineffective,
and a court action can only be initiated by the person wronged. Finally,
the Witchcraft Act is itself an unsatisfactory compromise between
English scepticism about witchcraft and African demands that it be
controlled."66 Only the pretense of possessing or using witchcraft to
162 See South Nyanza District Law Panel, Kisii Section. Minutes of a Meeting held
on December 12-14, 1950, No. 38. "Any person convicted of causing the death of
[persons] by means of witchcraft was polted [sic] or stoned by a crowd of his rela-
tives until he was dead." See also Witchcraft at 231.
163 Nyansongo at 83.
164 Witchcraft at 233-39.
165 Women do sometimes sue their husbands for assault, but only when divorce is
pending or has been granted. See, e.g., Kisii DAC CC 13/66 (Feb. 8, 1966); cf. Kiambu
Mag. CA 117/65 (July 5, 1967), dismissing appeal from Githunguri AC CC 330/64
(June 22, 1964) (Kikuyu). A divorced woman may also sue her former husband for
the return of property which he has retained. In Kisii DAC CC 193/66 (June 30,
1966) plaintiff claimed that she had been "eloped" by defendant, and then sent away
by him four months later. She sled for the value of her labor during the time ,she
was living with him. The court rejected her claim as contrary to customary law.
166 Very few prosecutions are brought under the Act. In 1966 there were only 464
in all of Kenya, or a mere .2% of all criminal cases. Convictions are difficult to
secure. See, e.g., Kisii DAC CrC 1313/66 (Sept. 20, 1966) (accused acquitted because
the prosecution failed to prove the three essential ingredients of the offence under
section 5: the articles must be ones usually used in the exercise of witchcraft; they must
be carried for the purpose of causing fear or annoyance; the accused must have them
without reasonable excuse. The accused here claimed that the medicine was f6r his
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cause fear, annoyance or injury is punished, not the possession or prac-
tice itself. Yet it was precisely this pretense that Agnes wanted ter-
minated. She was not concerned to punish her tormentors for she
accused only Barnabas, who had custody of the materials used to
frighten her, but not his equally culpable accomplices. Rather, she
prosecuted her husband for the same reason that she sought to divorce
him, "so that he may return my hair and knickers to me." It is ironic
that the inadequacy of traditional remedies against this form of witch-
craft compelled Agnes to turn for protection to the 'agnostic' state
which had the power to do just this." 7
The court encountered little difficulty in reaching a decision on the
basis of the evidence presented in these two cases. Any ambiguities in
Barnabas' behavior were resolved by his shaving of Agnes, which un-
mistakably identified his entire course of conduct with the common
Gusii syndrome of husbands using witchcraft to control unfaithful
wives." 8 Consequently, the court's examination of Agnes and her wit-
nesses was most perfunctory. It was easily satisfied with her responses
to questions of fact; there could be little doubt that the possibility of
informal reconciliation had been exhausted; the issue of custody was
postponed to another case. Even though Barnabas had voluntarily
testified under oath,'69 his statements were so little worthy of credence
that the court would not even take the effort to question him. Nor
did Barnabas exert himself greatly on his own behalf; he failed to
bring any witnesses in the divorce case. To the extent that he was
relying on Agnes' adultery to justify his resort to witchcraft, his hopes
were vain. Adultery was certainly wrong, but a husband has other
remedies: he could chastise his wife by beating,' ° he could claim com-
pensation from her father for the adultery, " ' he could prosecute her
own protection against devils). Even when the accused is proved guilty sentences are
relatively light. See, e.g., Kisii DAC CrC 1029/66 (July 21, 1966) (150/- fine or three
months imprisonment); Kisii DAC CrC 1006/66 (July 26, 1966) (30/- fine or one month
extra-mural penal employment; charms to be destroyed). This attitude is in sharp
contrast with the concern which Africans demonstrate about witchcraft in the numer-
ous defamation cases which concern such accusations. See, e.g., Kisii DAC CC 298/66
(Sept. 13, 1966) (claim of 200/- compensation for being called a witch); Kisii DAC
CC 241/66 (July 21, 1966) (claim of 200/- for being called a witch).
167 Witchcraft Act, Laws of Kenya, cap. 67, §5 (rev. ed. 1962): "the charm or
other article [usually used in the exercise of witchcraft for the purpose of causing
fear] shall be forfeited and destroyed or otherwise dealt with in such a way as the
magistrate may direct."
18 As in the Luo case, this court's perception that Gusii husbands use witchcraft to
control errant wives was a statement about modal, not normative behavior; it was not
a statement of what the "reasonable" Gusii does, or should do. Cf. note 110, supra.
169 The accused may elect to give a sworn statement, in which case he is subject to
cross-examination; or an unsworn statement, in which case he is not; or no statement at
all. See Criminal Procedure Rules for African Courts, §50 (n.d.).
170 Nyansongo at 22.
171 The wife's father was liable to pay compensation of a cow worth 200/-, and to
provide a goat worth 30/- to cleanse his daughter. See Kisii District Law Panel, Special
Meeting to Record Customary Criminal Offences, §1 (Aug. 16, 1961).
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paramour.72 or sue him civilly for the return of the woman,' or in the
end he could divorce her."' That witchcraft had traditionally been
used by Gusii husbands in such circumstances did not legalize the prac-
tice. Witchcraft was far too extreme a response to this kind of misbe-
havior, and was in any case now illegal.
Having concluded that Barnabas had employed witchcraft threats,
the court still had to determine the proper remedy. Since witchcraft
has always been sufficient ground for divorce, Agnes' first plea clearly
had to be granted. Moreover, divorce is almost never refused when it
has the support of a girl's father. Moseti's advocacy of his daughter's
cause may have served a selfish motive, but his eloquence clearly
showed that he honestly shared her fear that she would be bewitched
and was seeking to protect her. To award the divorce, however, did
not itself secure that protection. The court therefore accompanied its
decree with an order that Barnabas relinquish the materials by means
of which he wielded his unlawful power. In doing so it hoped to
avoid recourse to penal sanctions which could only intensify Barnabas'
anger and resentment, and thus augment rather than mitigate Agnes'
danger. But this command merely placed Barnabas in a further
legal dilemma: if he defied the court's mandate he risked the penalties
of the law; if he surrendered Agnes' clothing and hair he stood con-
fessed as a witch. The severity of social sanctions against witches ap-
parently proved more fearsome than punishment for contempt, even
when contempt made inevitable a conviction in the criminal case.
Thus, in effect, the traditional power of a husband to discipline an
unfaithful wife by witchcraft was preserved, in defiance of courts and
modern law, at a relatively small price.
The substantive law for which this case stands can be stated very
simply: a husband who threatens his wife with witchcraft may be
divorced by her, and may also be fined 40/-. The rule could easily
have been elicited from any informant. But I hope my analysis has
shown that a great deal more can be learned from the case. First, the
172 Id. §§I-2. Both adultery and removing a married woman without the consent of
her husband were customary offences for which the penalty was a fine of up to 500/-
and/or imprisonment of up to six months. See, e.g., Kisii DAC CrC 117/66 (Feb. 23,
1966) (350/- fine or four months imprisonment for removing married woman). See
also Cotran, Report on Customary Criminal Oflences in Kenya, Appendix A at 10
(n.d.) (Cyclostyled; copy in possession of author). These offences were abolished as of
July 1, 1966. See reference cited note 69 supra.
173 See, e.g., Kisii DAC CC 327/66 (Sept. 7, 1966) (plaintiff claimed for and re-
ceived his wife from the defendant). The husband may also claim for the expenses he
incurred in tracing and retrieving his wife. See Kisii District Law Panel, op. cit. supra
note 171, §2. Those criminal cases which were pending on July 1, 1966 were often
transformed into civil claims for the return of a wife. See, e.g., Kisii DAC CC 280/66
(Nov. 25, 1966), transferred from Kisii DAC CrC 692/66 (originally filed on May 17,
1966). See Cotran at 68. See also note 69 supra.
174 Kisii Law Panel, Minutes of Meetings held at Kisii, Dec. 10-11, 1962, C.7.A.3.a.(3).
Habitual adultery (obutomani). See Cotran at 70.
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genesis of the dispute is discovered in the strains inherent in the early
stages of Gusii marriage. Second, the choice of a means of expressing
this conflict is illuminated. A young wife is deprived of most outlets
for her hostility, and hence must speak through the language of witch-
craft to justify her desertion and lay the foundation for a divorce. More-
over, she must address the appropriate authority-here the courts-and
hence is constrained by the form of colonial legislation. Thirdly, once
the parties are in court the judicial process is seen to be more than the
mere mechanical application of rules to a clearly perceived factual
situation." ' The evidence is too inconclusive for this. Although Agnes
had the benefit of the real evidence of her shaved head, Barnabas could
point to the absence of eye-witness testimony. In the end both litigants
and court had to rely on perceptions of modal behavior to resolve con-
flicts in the circumstantial evidence-creating inferences of fact, color-
ing actual incidents, and discrediting inconsistent testimony. Thus
Barnabas could suggest that, when an absconding wife takes her be-
longings with her, she has probably deserted voluntarily. But Agnes
could reply that when she runs off into the night leaving her infant
behind she has certainly been driven away. The court could accept both
propositions, finding that when a woman does desert, with the con-
nivance of her father, there is likely to be another prospective suitor
involved; and that Gusii husbands have in the past been driven by
jealousy to resort to witchcraft to control errant wives. Finally, the
product of these evidentiary principles-the judgment-must itself
be subjected to scrutiny, for it is seen that though Agnes had the bene-
fit of the court's decision in each case, both judgments were ineffective to
counteract the threat of witchcraft. The skeleton of substance-the
anatomy of the law-is thus fleshed out with an understanding of how





The materials examined so far have been drawn entirely from the
primary courts, an approach which may appear unusual to legal
scholars accustomed to analyze appellate decisions. This portion of
the paper, therefore, will consider the extent to which African circum-
stances justify, and perhaps require modification of the techniques of
175 Cf. Epstein, op. cit. supra note 121, at 212: "few disputes center upon the applica-
tion of a single unequivocal rule, and the more usual content of a dispute is a dialogue
of norm and counter-norm."
178 Cf. Radcliffe-Brown, "On Social Structure," 70 1. Roy. Anthrop. Inst. (1940),
reprinted in Structure and Function in Primitive Society 188, 195 (1952): "Besides
this morphological study, consisting in the definition, comparison and classification of
diverse structural systems, there is a physiological study. The problem here is: How
do structural systems persist? What are the mechanisms which maintain a network of
social relations in existence, and how do they work?"
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conventional scholarship. Reliance on appellate judgments appears to
derive from three interrelated assumptions. Central among these is the
belief that lawyers should focus their attention on the interpretation
and development of legal rules. Procedures for the preliminary deter-
mination of the facts to which these rules are applied are of secondary
interest, relegated largely to the 'restricted field of evidence. In the
American judicial system, indeed, issues of fact are generally entrusted
to the jury, about whose functioning astonishingly little is known.
Second, granting this concern, appellate judgments contain a' better
discussion of substantive rules, for two reasons. Since they are un-
complicated by factual controversies, issues of law are presented more
sharply and in greater detail. Moreover, the level of judicial analysis
is higher because there is an assumed correlation between talent and
rank in the appellate structure. Finally, reliance on the judgments of
the highest court is both permitted and required by the hierarchical
nature of our judicial system: permitted because decisions of an ap-
pellate court are binding on the subsequent actions of an inferior
tribunal; required because deviant behavior in a primary court does not
accurately reflect the "real" law enshrined in appellate decisions.
The following diagram summarizes the earlier description of the
Kenya appeals system and will help in assessing the relevance of these
principles to Kenya.
Judicial Structure of Kenya, 1930-present
1. Civil cases: High Court (1967-present)
Court of Review (1951-67)
Supreme Court (1930-51)
Criminal cases: High Court (1964-67)
Supreme Court (1930-64)
2. Provincial African Courts Officer (1951-67)
Provincial Commissioner (1930-51)




4. African Court of Appeal (1951-64)
Native Appeals Tribunal (1930-51)
5. Third Class District Magistrate (1967-present)
African Court (1951-67)
Native Tribunal (1930-51)
Can the central assumption of conventional legal scholarship-
concern with the analysis of legal rules-be retained in this judicial
environment? I think not. Of the several thousand cases which I read,
very few of those decided by African Courts or Appeals Magistrates
involved controversies about the identity or desirability of rules. Though
parties might emphasize different rules they rarely challenged those
advanced by an opponent, or urged judicial modification of an existing
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rule. Nor did courts engage in the development of substantive law on
their own initiative. Rather, as the two case analyses already presented
should indicate, attention was directed toward the determination of
disputed facts. It was within this process of fact-finding that substan-
tive rules played their role, being invoked by a litigant to strengthen
his own evidence and discredit that of an opponent (as in the Gusii
case), and being utilized by the judge to choose between inconsistent
stories (as in the Luo case). The Kenya decisions thus seem to pro-
vide striking confirmation of Jerome Frank's contention that "fact-
uncertainty" is the principal source of legal uncertainty.177 If this view
of the judicial process is correct, then surely legal scholarship should
be concerned primarily to discover the critical rules governing the
determination of facts and not allow itself to be limited by conven-
tional preoccupations to the study of substantive principles which are
relatively clear and static because they are isolated from the stress of
controversy which might force them to develop.
Conventional scholarship was best served by the examination of
appellate decisions. To the extent that appellate courts in Kenya share
with their English or American counterparts a devotion to the explica-
tion of rules, the radical change in focus just suggested may demand a
re-evaluation of the utility of such decisions. In actuality, however,
appeals in Kenya were conducted differently. Until recently reports of
primary court proceedings were not adequate to allow an appellate
court to restrict its review to the record alone. Hearings by African
Courts of Appeal were always de novo, and District Officers and
Appeals Magistrates often heard a great deal of additional testimony."8
However, subsequent appeals to the Provincial Commissioner, Pro-
vincial African Courts Officer, and Court of Review, were based en-
tirely on the record and suffered from that limitation. But though it
seems that the higher the judge the less opportunity he had to consider
vital factual issues, may this disadvantage not be outweighed by his
superior judicial ability? The answer is unclear. A judge's rank in the
177 Frank, Law and the Modern Mind xiv (6th ed. 1949). Although Frank, of
course, made his assertion about the American legal system, his observations may be
even more illuminating in the African context. Factual disputes are pervasive in the
primary courts of Kenya because standards of veracity are extremely low. Litigants
offer self-serving testimony and witnesses are expected to support the party who called
them. In the course of a year of leafing through tens of thousands of cases, I came
across only one prosecution for perjury (actually a citation for contempt by an irate
judge). Issues of law receive relatively less attention, perhaps because there is no pro.
fessional bar with a vested interest in raising them.
178 That this was the practice despite explicit instructions to the contrary is some
index of the inadequacy of many primary court judgments, See Waller, African
Courts Handbook: Guide to Heaing of Civil Appeals by District Officers 1-2 (1961):
"hear only such additional evidence as may be necessary to elucidate any 'issue' or may
be necessary in the light of the appellant's statement. It may often happen that no
additional evidence is necessary at all; do not start to record all evidence 'de novo.'
You are hearing an appeal, not a case of the first instance; ... "
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judicial hierarchy may well be correlated with his legal skills, but un-
fortunately such rank also appears to have varied inversely with knowl-
edge of, and tolerance for, customary law and its social background.
There was little difference in terms of these criteria between primary
court judges and those who sat on the African Courts of Appeal, except
perhaps in length of experience, since personnel circulated between
the two. The rest of the appellate structure may be divided into two
categories. The first, and by far the largest, was the expatriate bench.
Prior to independence this included the District Officers, Provincial
Commissioners, Provincial African Courts Officers,' 9 Court of Re-
view, " ' and High Court. Today, Asians and Europeans still occupy
most of the higher levels-as Resident Magistrates' 8 ' and judges of
the High Court.'82 With significant exceptions the upper echelons of
this group, though legally sophisticated, possessed little or no under-
standing of customary law. The attitude of the lower strata varied
greatly, depending on term of duty and personal inclination, but few
had any legal training.
The African bench is almost entirely confined to the primary courts
and, since the early 1960's, the first level of appeal-formerly the Ap-
peals Magistrates and now the First Class Magistrates. Although the
latter are a heterogeneous group they share certain advantages. All
possess, as part of their culture, a sensitivity to customary legal thought
and a familiarity with local behavioral patterns. As members of the
educated elite, they have benefited from a superior secondary educa-
tion and often have received some legal training as well. Nevertheless,
the value of cultural affinity is largely lost when these magistrates are
posted outside their own community, as is often the case.' Though
customary legal systems may be uniform in general principles, detailed
rules vary widely; magistrates must then apply these alien rules to an
unfamiliar sociocultural environment. Moreover, they must often work
through interpreters. And education is also of ambiguous value: the
greater eloquence obtained may only be used to express a condescend-
ing rejection of customary law which exceeds, in cultural bias, the
opinions of expatriate judges. Yet despite these drawbacks, I found
that on balance many Magistrate's Appeals were both superior in
evidentiary record and legal analysis to the decisions of the primary
179 There are exceptions, for instance S. R. Karunditu, who was for some time
acting Provincial African Courts Officer for Central Province.
180 One African, Shadrack Malo, a Luo, did sit on the Court.
181 There have only been two African Resident Magistrates: Mr. N. K. Nyang'era, a
Gusii, who sat at Kisii, and Mr. Sidi-Okumu, a Luo, who recently resigned from the
Machakos court.
182 The first African, Mr. Mwendwa, was appointed to the High Court as Chief
Justice in 1968.
183 Of the seventeen Appeals Magistrates about whom I have information, only nine
were posted exclusively within their own communities.
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courts, and at the same time more valuable than the judgments pro-
duced by subsequent reviews.
Even if appellate decisions possess no advantages for the scholar, their
use may be mandated by a hierarchical system which endows them
with a more authoritative voice in the statement of legal principles. But
again the Kenya judicial system, though formally hierarchical, does
not function this way. Superior courts can exert authority over inferior
tribunals in two ways: by reversing erroneous judgments in the rela-
tively small number of cases actually appealed, and by requiring that
the vast number of cases which do not reach them be governed by
appellate precedent. Appellate courts in Kenya do indeed reverse, and
enforce their reversals, but too small a proportion of the body of liti-
gation is appealed for this first method to have any substantial impact
on the legal process. Of the approximately 250,000 cases decided by pri-
mary courts in 1966, no more than two or three thousand, or about one
percent, were appealed to a magistrate, and only one percent of this
latter group reached the Court of Review. Nor is this lack of direct
impact adequately supplemented by the influence of example. Appel-
late decisions fail to compel that degree of obedience from the lower
courts which they secure in England or America for two reasons. First,
they are simply not known. None of the opinions of the Appeals Magis-
trates are published and only a small selection of those of the Court of
Review. Only the lower court whose decision is being altered is noti-
fied, and even it receives a mere statement that the appeal has been
allowed, unenlightened by reasoning. Communication from the top of
the hierarchy is largely restricted to occasional circulars from, and
personal contact with, the African Courts Officer.
An extreme example may help to dramatize the importance of this
point. In 1961 Nehemiah removed a girl from the school where she
was studying and took her to live with him.' Josphat, the girl's father,
sued under Luyia "customary law" since both parties were of that
tribe, and claimed repayment of the school fees he had expended for
his daughter's education, a total of 1175/-. The Lurambi African
Court awarded Josph'at 800/- for school fees, 8 ' and though this was
184 Lurambi AC CC 227/61 (Apr. 19, 1961), appeal allowed, Kakamega ACA CA
83/61 (June 3, 1961), appeal allowed, Kakamega DO CA 83/61 (Nov. 27, 1962), appl.
to COR allowed, Kakamega District Registry Appl. 12/62 (May 15, 1964), appeal
allowed, COR Appl. 1/64 (Ainley, C. J., n.d.). The names used for the parties are
pseudonyms.
185 It gave no explanation for this figure. The girl had completed Standard VI at
Intermediate School. Josphat agreed to accept brideprice but defendant refused to pay it.
The court reasoned that defendant had taken the girl from school and now refused
to pay brideprice for no reason. Defendant had previously been prosecuted for the
customary crime of removing an unmarried girl and had been fined 100/-. Lurambi-
AC CrC 578/60 (n.d.). At that time he had agreed to pay six head of cattle brideprice
but had since failed to do so.
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reversed by the African Court of Appeal, 8' it was reinstated by the
District Officer.' However, the Court of Review reduced the judg-
ment to a heifer, worth 250/- which it found was all that customary
law allowed. It relied on a memorandum by the African Courts Offi-
cer which stated:
As the girl lived with Nehemiah for some time, the father can
claim one heifer as Luhya customary compensation for deflower-
ing the girl which is presumed in a case of elopment. The claim
for return of school fees even though interpreted by the District
Officer as general compensation is untenable in this customary
claim for compensation.
In another case, less than two years later, Adagala sued Isaya and his
father, Shidula, because Isaya had impregnated Adagala's daughter
Zibora while they were in school together.'88 He claimed compensation
for the 990/25 in school fees which he had spent for his daughter. The
Hamisi African Court, located only a few miles from the Lurambi
African Court, appeared to be ignorant of the Court of Review's deci-
sion, and granted Adagala 661/- for the fees he had been able to prove.
Only Shidula appealed and the Appeals Magistrate, who had by then
succeeded the District Officer, allowed this appeal on the limited
ground that a father cannot be held liable for pregnancy caused by an
adult son. The African Courts Officer happened to see this decision
and wrote an irate letter:...
What exactly does your judgment mean? Have you set aside the
decision of the Hamisi African Court against both father and son,
or only against the father? May I remind you and all Western
Province African Courts that the Court of Review has already
decided that there can be no claim for refund of ALL a girl's
education costs because she becomes pregnant. She does not lose
her education because she has a child. A parent can of course
recover school fees paid in advance for the period the girl does not
attend school as a result of her pregnancy.
186 The Court of Appeal found for defendant because he had agreed to pay seven
head of cattle brideprice and subsequently produced five head, which plaintiff had
refused on the ground that they were too young. This excuse was unsatisfactory because
plaintiff could have asked the elders to require defendant to produce better animals.
187 The District Officer stated: "I consider that plaintiff has a justifiable claim to
compensation for a clear departure from native custom. . . Compensation is fairly
assessed at school fees paid out to prepare the daughter for marriage to a good class
husband. This girl cannot expect to get any but an inferior husband."
188 Hamisi AC CC 8/66 (Jan. 18, 1966), appeal allowed in part, Kakamega Mag. CA
89/66 (Aug. 26, 1966), re-hearing ordered by ACO (letter of Dec. 3, 1966), appeal al-
lowed in part, Kakamega Mag. CA 89/66 (Dec. 22, 1966). The names used for the
parties are pseudonyms.
188 Letter of African Courts Officer to Kakamega Appeals Magistrate, Oct. 26, 1966.
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The Magistrate justified his failure to allow an appeal by Isaya on the
grounds that Isaya had not taken an appeal, and replied plaintively: 9
Adagala and Shidula are satisfied with my judgment, and Isaya
with the judgment of the Hamisi African Court, since they have
not complained. They are satisfied with it though it may be against
the ruling of the Court of Review that there can be no claim for
refund of all a girl's education costs. I was not informed of this
ruling except when you wrote to me on 26.10.66 [the above letter].
If it is against the ruling of the Court of Review of which I was
not aware then I can see no justification when you say that you
are NOT satisfied with the manner in which this appeal was tried.
Please you as my Senior Officer and as the African Courts Officer
if my work does not satisfy you, say so and I am ready to accept
any other duties that you may assign me.'
More important than the impassioned tone of this exchange is the fact
that once again its contents were not communicated to those primary
courts in Western Province which were supposed to be bound by this
ruling. Both before and after the letter from the African Courts Officer,
in the Lurambi court whose judgment had originally stimulated the
decision by the Court of Review, in the Hamisi court whose judgment
was here reversed, and elsewhere in Kakamega District, plaintiffs sought
and recovered compensation for all the school fees they had paid for
daughters who had been removed from school and impregnated by
defendants.'92
190 Letter of Kakamega Appeals Magistrate to African Courts Officer, Nov. 10, 1966.
19' On re-hearing the Magistrate found that Adagala had paid 300/- for his daughter's
last year of schooling, and that she had been expelled after completing half of it
because of pregnancy. He therefore allowed 150/- damages. He did not allow com-
pensation for pregnancy of two head of cattle because the boy and girl were related,
and under such circumstances no compensation is paid.
192 See, e.g., Hamisi AC CC 1/66 (Jan. 15, 1966) (claim for one head of cattle
pregnancy compensation and 1500/- school fees; defendant agreed to pay 500/- school
fees, 177/- court costs and 23/- transport, which the court approved); Lurambi AC CC
388/66 (Sept. 22, 1966) (judgment for one head of cattle, customary pregnancy com-
pensation; one sheep for cleansing since the parties were related, and 800/- school fees);
Lurambi AC CC 441/66 (Oct. 10, 1966) (judgment for 450/- school fees); Lurambi
AC CC 515166 (Dec. 21, 1966) (judgment for two head of cattle customary pregnancy
compensation and 700/- school fees; this case was decided after the letter from the
ACO); Khwisero AC CC 153/66 (Aug. 31, 1966) (judgment of 1350/- school fees;
this court is also subordinate to the Kakamega Appeals Magistrate); Emuhaya AC CC
78/66 (May 4, 1966) (judgment for 900/- school fees; this court also falls within the
same appellate system). The Kakamega Magistrate who had received the reproof
clearly learned his lesson, and in subsequent appeals he reduced all awards to the two
head of cattle which traditionally constituted customary compensation. See, e.g., Kaka-
mega Mag. CA 128/66 (Apr. 10, 1967), dismissing appeal from, but varying award of,
Butali AC CC 535/66 (July 25, 1966) (original claim 1200/-; lower court awarded 800/-;
on appeal reduced to 300/- representing two head of cattle); Kakamega Mag. CA 178/66
(Jan. 3, 1967), dismissing appeal from, but varying award of, Ikolomani AC CC 312/
66 (Aug. 29, 1966) (original claim 2000/-; 1000/- allowed below, reduced to 300/- on
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Yet ignorance is not the only reason for nonconformity with appel-
late decisions; even were copies of opinions available to the primary
courts it is doubtful whether they would have commanded much
respect. The elders of the African Courts felt with some justice that
they knew better how to resolve disputes according to customary law
than did the appellate judges-certainly they were more skilled than
the European and Asian bench, and probably more adept than African
magistrates, who were strangers to the local community and might even
be from another tribe.' Moreover, were adherence to precedent not
voluntary, it would be very difficult to compel. Direct review by an
administrative official could be frustrated by recording a distorted ver-
sion of the evidence to make it appear that an unpopular rule was being
faithfully applied, when in fact it was being ignored. Even absent such
distortion, effective administrative review of the vast mass of litigation
was impossible within a system which aimed to provide inexpensive
legal redress on a balanced budget. 4 Nor was the informal supervision
provided by the professional bar in developed countries available, since
the Kenya bar was not interested in and in any case had little access to
unpublished primary decisions.
Perhaps this somewhat abstract discussion of the merits and draw-
backs of various sources can be given substance by analysis of the
progress of an actual case through a series of appeals. For, notwith-
standing all the criticisms just offered, I did make extensive use of
Magistrate's Appeals, for two quite unrelated reasons. 9 On balance,
greater literacy and legal sophistication outweighed any unfamiliarity
with or bias against customary law. Moreover, such bias might possess
considerable significance for legal development since the Magistrates
decided enough cases to have a substantial impact within the legal
process. Finally, appellate case files contained a full record of primary
court proceedings, as well as the evidence heard and judgment ren-
dered on appeal. 9 ' Apart from these considerations, however, there
appeal). However, another magistrate who subsequently sat in the same court was
apparently unaware of the ruling. See Kakamega Mag. CA 50/67 (Feb. 23, 1968),
allowing appeal from Ikolomani AC CC 388/66 (Oct. 15, 1966) (reversed lower court's
award of compensation for pregnancy for lack of evidence, but no mention made of the
size of award, which was 756/- for school fees).
193 This attitude is undoubtedly changing as primary court judges receive more legal
education, concurrently adopting Western attitudes, and as the appellate structure is
Africanized.
194 District Officers, and subsequently Appeals Magistrates, did have the power to
revise any decision of an African Court. African Courts Ord., Laws of Kenya, cap. 11,
§44 (rev. ed. 1963) as amended by African Courts (Amendment) Ord., No. 50 of
1962, §33. My impression is that, at least in civil cases, this power has not been widely
used in the recent past. It was eliminated by the Magistrate's Courts Act, No. 17 of
1967.
195 There were only about a dozen decisions by the Court of Review relevant to my
subject during the decade or more that it functioned.
I'l As stated earlier, all papers filed in a case are kept in the court which passes the
1969]
HeinOnline  -- 17 Am. J. Comp. L. 619 1969
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 17
was an overwhelming advantage in terms of convenience and efficiency.
In the early 1960's the African Courts Officer instructed the Appeals
Magistrates to send him a typed carbon copy of every judgment.' He
has thus collected more than 5,000 judgments, handed down since about
1963, which are filed in the Law Courts in Nairobi. I used these
materials intensively during the first two months of my field work in
order to obtain a synoptic view of the role of customary law in the
judicial process. From this source I have deliberately chosen an
atypical case to illustrate in extreme form the differences in ability and
attitude among the several levels of the judicial hierarchy. The parties
are all Kamba.' 8
Plaintiff: Paul
Defendant: John
Claim: Damage to reputation, 300/- (filed Oct. 16, 1963,).
Facts: Paul alleged that on 17 September 1963 he was walking along a road
with two old women, Esther and Lidia on the way to address a political
meeting when he was overtaken by John. John asked the women if they were
going to vote for him. They replied that they did not consider that he would
compete with Paul at the elections. John rebuked them, saying that they
should vote for Paul because he gave them mamwana (bread toasts) and
slept with them. Paul asked John to repeat that, but John refused and rode
off on his bicycle. John denied meeting Paul on that date. He said that he
was speaking at a different place.
Judgment of the Nziu African Court: for Paul, 300/- damages. Paul and John
held political meetings at different places on that date, but they had met and
John had used insulting words to Paul in the presence of the two women.
John's grounds of appeal: John again denied meeting Paul on that date and
wanted to call an additional witness to support his denial. John also wished
to swear a kithitu oath'99 to prove his allegations.
Evidence on appeal: John was allowed to call a witness, Kisuko, who confirmed
John's alibi.
200
final judgment. In 1966 there were twenty-five Appeals Magistrates Courts in Kenya:
Kiambu, Murang'a, Thika, Kerugoya, Nyeri, Embu, Meru, Machakos, Kitui, Wun-
danyi, Kilifi, Kwale, Mombasa, Nakuru, Naivasha, Eldoret, Kitale, Kericho, Kisii,
Homa Bay, Kisumu, Kakamega, Bungoma, Kapsabet, and Nairobi.
197 These judgments contain a summary of the evidence and decision below, the
grounds of appeal, any additional evidence heard, and a reasoned opinion. However,
the record is not complete, and testimony and cross-examination are omitted.
19 Nziu AC CC P278/63 (n.d.), appeal allowed, Machakos Mag. CA 98/64 (R.
Mullaa, May 5, 1965), appl. to COR allowed, Machakos District Registry Appl. P30/65
(ACO, May 19, 1965), appeal dism'd, COR Appl. 7/66 (Ainley, C. J., Feb. 9, 1967).
The Kamba are a Bantu people numbering about a million, who live in Eastern
Province, just east of Nairobi. All the names used are pseudonyms.
199A kithitu is an object on which an oath is sworn; it is alleged to kill a perjurer
or his near kin within six months. Traditionally it was greatly feared and highly
effective at insuring truthful testimony. See Penwill, Kamba Customary Law 56-66
(1951). That it has much less power today is shown by the instant case. John's story was
probably false yet he, an educated man, was anxious to swear to it on the kithitu in
order to impress the more credible primary court.
20o That the court allowed John to call an additional witness who could easily have
been produced below shows the readiness of appellate courts to hear further testimony.
Compare note 178 supra.
HeinOnline  -- 17 Am. J. Comp. L. 620 1969
ABEL: LAW IN KENYA
Judgment of the Machakos Appeals Magistrate: for John. "Both parties in this
case are politicians. During the month when this dispute arose both were
contesting for one seat at the Machakos County Council 201 elections. They
both belonged to one political party then." The court was convinced that
the parties held political meetings at different places on the day involved,
but that they did meet on the road. ". . . one thing is that the defendant did
not talk to the plaintiff but to the women. The alleged insulting words were
said to the women. The question is whether the alleged words were said by
John as claimed by Paul and his witness. And further did the words alleged
spoken amount to defamation of Paul's good name. It must be remembered
here that the parties were great rivals over an election to a seat at the Macha-
kos County Council.... In my humble opinion I consider that these words
spoken by John were not defamatory to Paul but perhaps would have been
so to the two women. This is because John was directly talking to these
women, and as the Nziu African Court found the women were disappointed
[sic] with the defendant's insults to them. I have also considered the cir-
cumstances under which the words were spoken. John was trying to convince
the women to vote for him at the election. There were no other people
around who heard the alleged defamatory words. The two women were the
right wing [sic] supporters of Paul .... the parties have had fitina2°' long
before this dispute. This fitina is still existing." The court refused to allow
the oath.
[Paul then applied to the African Courts Officer for permission to submit
the case to the Court of Review, which was granted]
Judgment of the Court of Review: "This was a disgraceful thing to say, but it is
quite clear that John was merely being rude and abusive. It scarcely needs
saying that the two old ladies would realize that, and there is not the slightest
evidence on the record that anyone besides Paul, Esther and Lidia heard
these words. The fact is then that Paul's good name was not injured ...
We wish to say, however, that Kamba custom may possibly permit a man
to recover compensation for mere vulgar or scurrilous insults and abuse
which have not spoiled his name or lowered his reputation in the c6m-
munity, but which have caused him distress and affront.... If there is such
a custom, and a man wishes to base his claim on it, he must do so clearly
and at the outset of the case so that the trial court knows precisely the issues
which it has to try. . . .It is not only a matter of law, it is a matter of com-
mon sense that there is a vast difference between saying 'that man was rude
and insulting' and 'that man has lowered my reputation and damaged the
character which I hold among my friends.' To say one thing is to make, on
any showing, a trivial allegation. To say the other is to allege what may be
a very serious wrong indeed."
The substantive law in this area is unclear, and probably in a state of
flux. Kamba historically had a system of age-grades; although mem-
bership had to be achieved by making certain payments, these grades
served roughly to divide the male population into groups of coevals.2"'
A young man who had been disrespectful towards an elder would be
201 Machakos District contains well over half of the Kamba, and thus more than
half a million people. The position of county councillor is one of considerable status.
202 Jealousy, contention (swahili).
20 See Middleton and Kershaw, The Central Tribes of the North-Eastern Bantu 74-
75 (1965).
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required by his father to make the elder a gift of beer, at least equal in
value to a goat."°4 When courts were instituted insulted persons began
to seek redress in novel situations, and to ask for money compensation
in increasing amounts. Some courts have continued to emphasize the
age relationship, restricting recovery to elders insulted by youths," 5 and
denying it when the parties are of the same age.206 Others have ex-
tended the cause of action to allow a woman to sue a younger man.0 '
A few courts have held older men liable for insulting younger women0 8
or men,20" expressly rejecting the traditional basis of the tort:
I am satisfied that the old custom of the Kamba whereby the aged
were probably privileged to insult the young ones has died out in
these modern civilized periods and days where no one is privileged
to insult the other. 10
But most cases simply grant recovery without any reference to the
relative ages of the parties,21' recognizing that age-grades have lost
their traditional significance."' Similarly, there is no correspondence
204 See Penwill, Kamba Customary Law 110 (1951). The official value of a goat
today for judicial purposes is 20/-.
205 See, e.g., Machakos Mag. CA 156/65 (Dec. 22, 1965), dismissing appeal from
Iveti AC CC 450/65 (Nov. 30, 1965) (defendant said to plaintiff, an old mal, in
front of eight people, that he had been spoiled by harlots and was a rascal; plaintiff
awarded 200/- damages); Machakos Mag. CA 23/66 (Mar. 4, 1966), dismissing appeal
from Miu AC CC 2/66 (Jan. 24, 1966) (defendants, members of an age grade
inferior to that of plaintiff, said they wanted to have intercourse with him, and that
he was a dog and should die; plaintiff claimed 1000/- compensation and was awarded
600/-).
206 See, e.g., P1, P2, and P3 v. D, Machakos Mag. CA 66/65 (Sept. 21, 1965), dismissing
appeal from Miu AC CC ?/65 (Apr. 30, 1965) (P1 and P3 are of the same age group
as the defendant and therefore cannot recover).
207 Ibid. (P2, a woman is older than the defendant and therefore can recover).
208 See, e.g., Machakos Mag. CA 14/65 (Mar. 20, 1965), allowing appeal from Iveti
AC CC? (Jan. 8, 1965); Machakos Mag. CA 34/65 (Aug. 20, 1965), dismissing appeal
from Kangundo AC CC ?(n.d.): "The person abused is a woman and the person
who abused her is an old man of about the age of the woman's father .... I consider
that the abusive words used by the defendant are bad [stupid dog, devil, kino] and
especially when used by a man to a woman of a younger age than the man."
209 Machakos Mag. CA 43/67 (June 19, 1967), dismissing appeal from Miu AC CC
5/67 (n.d.) (plaintiff suing elder half-brother for saying "that he usually peeps dresses
of his daughter so as to find out whether she has committed adultery"; plaintiff
claimed 600/- compensation and received 200/-).
210 Ibid.
211 See, e.g., Machakos Mag. CA 31/65 (Aug. 19, 1965), allowing appeal from Kan-
gundo AC CC ? (Feb. 15, 1965) (upper and lower courts differing only on whether
there was sufficient evidence of the abuse; plaintiff claimed 150/- for being called a
stupid dog, and was allowed 100/-); Machakos Mag. CA 157/66 (Jan. 24, 1967), dis-
missing appeal from Miu AC CC 160/66 (n.d.) (plaintiff claimed 500/- for being
called a dog, and was allowed 300/-).
212 My Kamba research assistant, a second-year student at University College, Dar es
Salaam, did not know his age-grade, though he had lived at home until going to the
university.
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today between the traditional compensation of a goat and the money
claims made or allowed. 1 '
The Nziu African Court in the instant case apparently followed
contemporary notions of abuse, since there was no evidence that Paul
and John were of different ages, and since the compensation awarded
was worth fifteen goats, not one. Its application of those rules, however,
showed little insight into the issues raised by the case, nor even an
accurate perception of the basic facts. 14 The Machakos Appeals Magis-
trate wrote a judgment displaying considerably greater juristic ability
in identifying and resolving the issues, although his presentation of
them is somewhat disorganized. He found three basic questions: had
the parties met; had John used the words alleged; did they create a
cause of action? The answers to the first two were clearly positive, thus
disposing of John's alibi. As for the third, there were two possible
claims-customary insult and common law defamation"'-and the
magistrate appears to have understood this distinction, although he
tends to use the two terms interchangeably. As a Kamba himself, he
recognized the existence of an action for insult without difficulty. How-
ever, the facts in this case did not satisfy an essential element of the
action, that the insulting words be addressed to the plaintiff.210 Treat-
ing Paul's complaint as one for defamation, the court again rejected it,
on alternative grounds. First, it did not satisfy the common law re-
quirements of publication and damage because the only persons who
heard the defamatory words were Paul's own supporters. Second, the
"circumstances under which the words were spoken" were such as to
preclude an action for damages: the litigants were both politicians,
members of the same party, between whom there had long been ill-
feeling; John uttered the words shortly prior to a hotly contested local
election in order to persuade the women, supporters of his opponent,
212 See cases cited in notes 205-211 supra.
214 As the Magistrate correctly noted, John had not used insulting words to Paul,
but to the two women.
215 One of the most fascinating aspects of the evolution of customary law in Kenya
is the gradual introduction of common law actions, for which there is no legal basis
whatsoever. The African Courts Ordinance which grants the courts jurisdiction quite
clearly states that the law to be applied is the "African customary law prevailing in
the area" (with other rules and statutes not relevant here). Laws of Kenya, cap. 11,
§18(a) (rev. ed. 1963). Nowhere were such courts authorized to administer the
common law. Nevertheless, actions for "defamation" are widespread throughout Kenya,
as are other claims clearly based on the English common law, e.g., breach of promise
of marriage, negligence, assault. I have never seen any discussion of this point, even
in those cases which reached the Court of Review. Indeed in the instant case the Court
of Review rejected a customary claim because it did not accord with the common
law, although the governing statute required it to do just the opposite.
216 The magistrate's recognition of this point shows that he was talking about a
distinct customary action for insult, since personal confrontation is not a requirement
of defamation. However, he may have been wrong that it is necessary in insult. See
Machakos Mag. CA 23/66 (Mar. 4, 1966), dismissing appeal from Miu AC CC 2/66
(Jan. 24, 1966) (plaintiff was not present when defendants uttered the words).
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to vote for him instead. The magistrate is here clearly seeking for a
policy which might support a justification for defamation, although
he never succeeds in making it explicit. 17
The Court of Review reached the same conclusion but by a divergent
route which revealed its premises to be fundamentally different from
those of the two lower courts. There could of course be no liability in
defamation because the words were only published to the two old
ladies who would recognize them as abusive and not defamatory.218
Where this court differed from the others was in its attitude towards
abuse. It had little sympathy with an action for "mere vulgar or scur-
rilous insults and abuse [my italics]" for it was. a matter of "common
sense" that such conduct was "trivial" when compared with words
injurious to reputation which "may be a very serious wrong indeed."
Although customary actions could not be abolished.1 the court was
determined to hedge them about with procedural impediments: plain-
tiffs would be required to state clearly and precisely at the outset of
the case the customary rule on which they wished to rely. This is in
sharp conflict with the generally informal practice of the primary
courts, whose official rules have never demanded strict pleading,22° and
is indeed in violation of the express language of the governing Act. 21
These three judgments thus characterize, and perhaps even carica-
ture, the approaches of the several levels of the judicial hierarchy. Pri-
mary court judgments, while most significant from the point of view
of numbers, may be empty of reasoning, and even misleading in the
217 Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
218 It is unclear where in the common law the court finds such a rule. It is clearly
defamatory of a man to say that he sleeps with other women. Perhaps the court is
arguing that the women would not believe such accusations, and hence would not lower
their estimate of Paul as a result.
219 Courts may refuse to apply a 'customary law which is "repugnant to justice or
morality," but the granting of compensation for abuse is hardly such a rule. African
Courts Ord., Laws of Kenya, cap. 11, §18(a) (rev. ed. 1963).
220 See African Courts Civil Procedure Rules:
§4, Filing of case: When a plaintiff wishes to file a civil action, the clerk shall
open a 'Case File' and shall record briefly in the space provided thereon the sub-
stance of the claim....
§34, The Plaint: The plaintiff shall give his evidence. . . . At the close of his
evidence he may be questioned by the court and cross-examined by the defendant.
From this evidence the court shall reduce to writing and enter the Particulars of
the Claim in the place provided in the 'Case File.' [Italics added]
Aside from the fact that these rules appear to be mutually inconsistent, it is ironic that
they were promulgated by the Chief Justice of Kenya, who also wrote the opinion
for the Court of Review in the instant case, under his authority derived from the
African Courts Ord., Laws of Kenya, cap. 11, §62(1) (a) (rev. ed. 1963).
221 African Courts Ord., Laws of Kenya, cap. 11, §54 (rev. ed. 1963):
No proceedings under this Ordinance in the Supreme Court, the Court of Review,
a magistrate's court or any African court . . . shall be varied or declared void
upon appeal, revision or review solely by reason of any defect in procedure or
want of form, but all matters shall be decided according to substantial justice with-
out undue regard to technicalities. [Italics added]
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statement and interpretation of rules. The Appeals Magistrate here
made a highly sophisticated application of customary rules to the facts
of the particular dispute. Indeed, he went beyond this and sought to
adapt customary law to changed conditions, balancing the traditional
concern to protect personal dignity by penalizing disrespectful behavior
against the modern desire to foster democratic government by allow-
ing the freedom to compete for political allegiance through the use
of loose language if necessary. However, innovative decisions like this
are rare and have a doubtful impact on the daily operation of the law.
Finally, the opinion of the Court of Review, while expressed with more
elegance and better organization, showed an unfortunate insensitivity
to customary legal principles and indigenous cultural attitudes. In a
small-scale society the man who is subjected to abuse may well suffer a
greater loss of self-respect and of standing in the community than the
man who is defamed.22 It is strange that the Chief Justice should have
been so ignorant of this fact when, little more than a century ago in
England and throughout Europe, equivalent words would have been
cause for a duel, possibly leading to the death of one of the partici-
pants.22"' But regrettably such incomprehension is not unusual: lack of
respect for differing values is always a danger when a person of one
culture is required to pass judgment on the behavior of someone from
another. A display of even more serious ethnocentrism may be found
in a similar case of customary abuse. Although the European magistrate
allowed the "trifling" damages he considered appropriate to what he
viewed as a "childish" case, he wrote:
This is a typical storm in a tea cup so typical of the Somali people.
... In my opinion it was a vulgar slanging match and not calcu-
lated slander.2
Not only did the magistrate fail to see that abuse, and not common law
slander, was the gravamen of the complaint, but he mistakenly as-
sessed the "trifling" damages by his own economic standard and not
by that of people living at a subsistence level. Although this statement,
and the opinion of the Court of Review in the principal case, are
unusually egregious examples of cultural blindness, they should stand
as a warning against over-ready acceptance of the pronouncements of
European judges on customary law. For it is hardly surprising that
primary courts do not, in practice, share this concern with reputation
rather than public dignity or self-respect, but continue to award
222 The vast number of complaints about abuse should be sufficient evidence of this.
222 This is still true in many parts of Europe today. See generally, Honour and Shame
(Peristiany ed. 1965).
224 Kakamega Mag. CA 24/64 (Oct. 28, 1964), dismissing appeal from Lurambi AC
CC 207/64 (n.d.).
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compensation, substantial in the eyes of the parties, for "mere" abuse
or insult." 5
III. CONCLUSION
This paper has described the methods employed in investigating the
customary laws of wrongs in Kenya, and has tried to show that some
of the tentative conclusions drawn from this -research may offer valu-
able insights into the nature and functioning of African legal systems.
I have argued that analysis of the entire content of individual case files,
including both evidence and judgment, leads to a much more so-
phisticated statement of substantive rules than can be elicited from an
informant. Moreover, only such analysis can reveal the application of
rules to characterize, imply, and contradict facts-in the strategies of
litigants and in the reasoning of judges-which I believe to be the
central concern of the judicial process. However, detailed consideration
of individual decisions must be placed in proper perspective in two
possible dimensions, horizontal and vertical.' First, how does the
behavior of these litigants, the nature of this claim, and the reaction of
this court compare with the norms for this type of litigation; this can
be learned from statistical analysis of the business of the primary
courts. Second, what is the role of these courts in the broader frame-
work of dispute settlement-both pre-judicial arbitration and appellate
review. When case studies are supported by this kind of information
they combine the essential criteria of depth and representativeness. I
hope by continued analysis of these materials to confirm the value of
such an approach.
225 See cases cited notes 205, 208, 209, and 211 supra, and Machakos Mag. CA 33/66
(Mar. 23, 1966), dismissing appeal from Kilungu AC CC 465/65 (Feb. 11, 1966)
(plaintiff claimed 100/- because defendant had called him a fool, shenzi (savage-
swahili), etc., and got full amount); Machakos Mag. CA 112/64 (Nov. 17, 1964),
allowing appeal from Nziu AC CC ?/64 (n.d.). In the latter case plaintiff alleged
that defendant bus conductors had insulted her when she had refused to ride in
their bus. They had told her to "go be fucked" and one of them had said: "Come
near and I will hold your legs apart for everyone to see your vagina and anus." The
lower court found neither insult nor defamation, but the Appeals Magistrate granted
the sum claimed, 150/-, although on the confusing grounds that "the insult used by
both defendants amounts to defamation ......
226 For reasons of space, two sections of the original paper, referred to below, have
been omitted. The first was a statistical analysis of litigation in the primary courts
which examined the characteristics of litigants, the kinds of claims they brought, and
the disposition by the court. The second was a detailed exposition of an instance of
extra-judicial dispute settlement by a group of Luyia magutu, which sought to explore
the relationship between informal arbitration and judicial institutions. Both of these
will appear in a version of this paper to be published by the East African Law Journal.
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